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West Europe Report

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25 January 1984

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SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT AGAINST MISSILES IS DISCUSSED

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 14 Dec 83 p 7

[Commentary by Staksteinar: "Peculiar Reciprocity"]

[Text] Reciprocity is the foundation of all diplomatic relations. The peculiar reciprocity in diplomatic relations between Iceland the Soviet Union has been pointed out so often that it is like carrying coal to Newcastle to mention it once again. However, we feel compelled to do so because of the Soviet Embassy's propagandist's misrepresentation of Icelandic affairs, including the Foreign Minister's and the Icelandic Government's position, as published in the Soviet Army newspaper, the RED STAR.

News in the RED STAR

E. Barbukho is chief of Reykjavik's Soviet Embassy's propaganda office, APN-Novosti. Several Icelanders, such as Maria Torsteinsdottir and Haukur Mar Haraldsson staff the office in the capacity of making Soviet propaganda palatable to Icelanders. That, however, is not this office's only role. They also feed lies to Soviet newspapers. Alexander Agarkov, Barbukho's predecessor, never returned to this country after one of his lies which appeared both in the PRAVDA and the IZVESTIA, through TASS, was discovered. This was about the same time that Svavar Gestsson visited Moscow.

Soviet News' latest issue includes a "news item" written by E. Barbukho for KRASNAJA ZVEZDA [RED STAR], the Soviet army's organ, in which he deals with a rudimentary guided missile by an American private individual much discussed in this country following a television news item. The Althing even discussed the matter. The American report wondered about possible uses for the missile should it actually be produced. E. Barbukho's interpretation to the military readers of the RED STAR follows:

"The attempts by the United States and NATO to lead the countries of northern Europe, particularly Iceland, into preparation for war was evident in a report specifically prepared for the Pentagon. This recently disclosed document bearing the title "Missile System in Iceland" contains a plan to place American missiles in Iceland and also in Scotland. The authors of the report had wanted

to place the missiles on Norwegian and Danish territories but had to contend with the fact that these countries' negative attitude towards atomic weapons precluded that plan.

"The aim of such plans is to close the so-called GIUK-gate, so that the Soviet fleet in the Barents Sea and other northern waters would be cut off should a war ensue.

"The disclosure of this document hit Iceland like a bomb. No one in the government had any idea that such plans existed: Iceland's ally in NATO knows very well that the country's stand is unchanged--no atomic weapons shall be placed within its borders."

Svavar Gestsson Quoted

E Barbukho continues: "On the fourteenth of November informal discussions took place in Iceland's Althing on Iceland's stand on the Pentagon's plans. Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson tried to calm the people and declared himself opposed to any placement of missiles in Iceland. Icelanders themselves should determine what weapons were to be placed within their borders; the Pentagon's plans were not always carried through. It was interesting to note that when the foreign minister started discussing the United States' plans for Iceland, he immediately defended Reagan's 'zero option' and the placement of missiles in Western Europe and had much to say about 'Soviet threat.'

"People's Alliance Chairman Svavar Gestsson, entering the discussion, suggested that the Althing pass special laws prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons in Iceland and expressed concern that decisions concerning the country's security could be made without most people's knowledge. He stated that it was obviously the Pentagon's intent to first put the missiles in place and then announce that fact, leaving the people of Iceland to like it or lump it.

"The leaders of the political parties in power--Independents and Progressives--did not support the proposal on the pretext that there was no disagreement between the government and the opposition on the placement of nuclear weapons within Icelandic borders. Thus NATO supporters in Iceland confirmed once again their opposition to legally banning the placement of nuclear weapons in Iceland."

[E. Barbukho, special correspondent for APN, written for KRASNAJA ZVEZDA, 11 Nov 83]

9981

CSO: 3626/15

FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS REFUSAL TO BACK UP ARMS RESOLUTION

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Dec 83 p 25

[Text] A joint session of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Althing was called yesterday to discuss a bill on a nuclear weapons freeze stand introduced by the Women's Party representative. The debate turned into a rather heated argument about Iceland's stand on disarmament and on the Swedish-Mexican proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze which was to be voted on in a general session of the United Nations yesterday.

The debate commenced with Svavar Gestsson's criticism of the lack of opportunity for the Althing to take a stand on the Mexican-Swedish proposal, with the government choosing to take its own stand, i.e., neutrality, without seeking input from the Althing.

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson stated that the government had in no way changed its stand on the matter since Svavar Gestsson was in the government. He also indicated that it would not be possible to deal with all four proposals on disarmament and peace now pending before the Christmas recess.

Olafur R. Grimsson stated that, with the foreign minister voting for the placement of nuclear missiles in Europe and with Iceland being one of the nations refusing to support the Mexican-Swedish proposal, the country had in effect declared itself a warmonger.

Geir Hallgrimsson countered that no protests had been forthcoming when the Soviets placed 369 nuclear missiles in Europe. He added that those wishing to brand Iceland as an enemy of peace could hardly be peace lovers themselves.

9981

CSO: 3626/15

ALTHING DEBATE ON MEXICAN-SWEDISH ARMS RESOLUTION REPORTED

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 17 Dec 83 p 32

[Text] A proposal for the Althing to take a stand on a nuclear weapons freeze introduced by the Women's Party to a joint session last Thursday generated a rather heated debate. Gudrun Agnarsdottir introduced the proposal, seconded and supported by Duna Kristmundsdottir and Kristin Halldorsdottir.

In her speech Gudrun Agnarsdottir stated that the proposal's aim was to call upon the Althing to take an international stand as a proponent of urging the Soviets and the United States to declare an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons, either separately but unanimously or jointly. Such a declaration would be the first step in a wide-ranging disarmament plan which would contain the following:

1. Total ban on experiments in production and placement of nuclear weapons, including complete halt on production of fissionable materials for military use.
2. A freeze subject to all the methods of verification and inspection already included in the SALT I and SALT II agreements, besides methods basically agreed on during a three-sided discussion in Geneva and on total ban on nuclear weapons experiments.
3. A freeze valid for five years but extendable if other nuclear powers join, as we hope they will do.

Fourth Proposal

Next on the agenda was Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson, who stated that three other disarmament proposals had been received and had been passed on to the Foreign Affairs Committee. He said that he saw no reason to deal specifically with the contents of this fourth proposal as the committee would and should do so.

Hjorleifur Guttormsson (People's Alliance) spoke next and declared his support of the Women's Party's proposal, as did Stefan Benediktsson (Socialist Coalition) on behalf of the Socialist Coalition.

No Stand on Proposals

Next on the agenda was Svavar Gestsson (People's Alliance). He expressed deep regret that the Althing alone among all national assemblies of Western Europe and North America had not gotten an opportunity to discuss nuclear concerns in recent times. Instead these matters had been passed on to committee with no input or stand possible by the Althing. He termed this regrettable since these were major concerns which would determine the fate of all mankind. On the other hand, he expected at least some of these matters to be taken care of before the Christmas recess.

Svavar Gestsson also criticized the lack of opportunity for the Althing to take a stand on the Mexican-Swedish proposal which today (Thursday) was to be debated in the UN General Assembly. He accused the government of taking its stand, i.e. neutrality, without conferring with the Althing and without ascertaining its stand on the matter.

Unchanged Stand

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson spoke next, urging Svavar Gestsson to think back to the time when he was a minister of the government with ample opportunity to discuss Iceland's stand on arms control on the international scene, an opportunity not exercised, making it difficult to lend credence to his present posturing since there had been no change in Iceland's stand since then.

Geir Halgrimsson then discussed briefly disarmament proposals presented to the Althing, pointing out that the Independence Party's proposal had been received early and would be sixth on the agenda for discussion. The other proposals had appeared later and were numbered 69 and 114 respectively, and this last proposal would be number 139. The fact that the proposals had not all been received at the same time should be proof enough that the government could not be blamed for trying to delay discussion of these matters in the Althing. He said he hoped that all four proposals could be dealt with simultaneously by the Foreign Affairs Committee, but the matter was too complicated to finish before the Christmas recess, besides which the Althing should allot ample time for discussion of such grave matters. The Althing's dignity was at stake in the handling of these matters, and the proposals should be combined in some fashion if possible. If not, a statement explaining the differences of opinion should be forthcoming.

Foreign Minister Uses His Power

The next speaker was Kjartan Johannsson (Socialist Party), who disclosed that at last Thursday morning's meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee a spirit of cooperation had been evident. But he decried past delays in the matters.

Svavar Gestsson (People's Alliance) spoke next and said that in a speech to the Althing recently the foreign minister had intimated his desire to ascertain the Althing's stand on the Mexican-Swedish proposal, but had then done nothing to facilitate such a presentation, no doubt fearing the Althing's support of

the proposal, and therefore acting unilaterally in the matter which could only be deplored.

Iceland Supporter of Armament

Olafur R. Grimsson (People's Alliance) asked if Geir Hallgrimsson had been representing the government's stand when he voted with NATO to support proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe, stating that the foreign minister's vote for the placement of Pershing missiles and guided missiles in Europe placed Iceland among the supporters of armament. He said the foreign minister had taken this stand while abroad, a fact that the Althing could not ignore. Furthermore, he termed this stand divergent from that of Denmark, Greece and Spain. He deplored Iceland's teaming up with nations unwilling to support the Mexican-Swedish proposal on nuclear arms freeze and Geir Hallgrimsson's request for cooperation within the Althing only in order to enable him to act unilaterally.

Base Attacks

Eyjolfur Konradsson (Independence Party), who chaired yesterday's meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was the next speaker, criticizing Olafur R. Grimsson for his base attacks on the foreign minister. He said the committee had decided on Thursday morning as a date for the meeting; thus the foreign minister could in no way be held responsible for any delays in this matter.

Nuclear Weapons Reduced by One-Third

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson spoke again and said the only conclusion to be drawn from this discussion was that the People's Alliance, refusing to reform, had no positive contributions to proffer. He stated that the placement of nuclear weapons in Europe had been approved in December 1979, placing the responsibility with three foreign ministers then and since: Kjartan Johannson, Olafur Johannesson and Geir Hallgrimsson, and although Iceland had supported the decision, its special position as an unarmed nation unwilling to have nuclear weapons placed within its borders had been made clear. He also refuted the statement that the placement of NATO missiles in Europe would cause proliferation of nuclear arms there. In spite of NATO's placement of 1,000 warheads last year and 1,800 this year, the withdrawal of an older missile in place of every new one, far from resulting in proliferation, actually made for one-third reduction of nuclear weapons. The Soviets, on the other hand, had placed 369 nuclear missiles each containing 3 warheads in Europe, averaging the placement of one missile a day, drawing not one word of protest from the People's Alliance. In his opinion NATO weapons were placed in response to this threat; NATO having offered to withdraw all its European missiles if the Soviets would do the same, but that offer had been refused. Geir Hallgrimsson added that those wishing to brand Iceland as an enemy of peace could hardly be peace lovers themselves and that Iceland could be proud of its stand in these matters.

He also denied any responsibility for delaying actions of the Althing.

Unchanged Foreign Policy

Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson stated that when the present government was formed all parties had agreed to an unchanged foreign policy, with the foreign minister alone responsible for forming that policy. The prime minister added that he welcomed all discussions on these matters but had not himself taken a stand on the placement of nuclear missiles in Europe.

He said he was inclined to favor Iceland's support for halting nuclear weapons production.

People's Alliance Prevents Cooperation

Ólafur G. Einarsson (Independence Party) commented on the People's Alliance's extraordinary participation in the discussion, as their main interest seemed to lie in preventing cooperation and progress in debates.

At this point several representatives of the People's Alliance requested to be heard, whereupon the joint session chairman resolved to postpone further discussion, explaining that agreement on minimal debate of the proposal in question had been reached earlier.

Ólafur R. Grímsson and Svavar Gestsson then requested to be heard on parliamentary procedures, but no more discussion was permitted and the proposal was passed on to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

9981

CSO: 3626/15

STORTING CONSERVATIVE MP: LABOR PARTY UNFAIR TOWARD U.S.

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Storting Member Grethe Varno: "USA's Guarantee the Essence of the Matter"]

[Excerpts] The United States is being used and misused in many ways in the missile debate. The core of the entire matter was and is how we are to preserve the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

This became a problem as early as during the first SALT agreement. Could the United States be counted on to be willing to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union or to contribute at all to the defense of Western Europe when American territory would be exposed to devastation--because strategic equality between the United States and the Soviet Union was recognized?

With the Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed it became a question not only of demonstrated will, but also of a flexible defense.

In addition, it was a political problem. Could one be sure that the Washington government really saw Europe as its forward defense line in the East and felt an acute Soviet threat to its security?

During President Reagan's term in office we have become used to a strong stress upon forward American interests. It is rather difficult to remember that there was a time when one constantly sought new confirmation of the American positive security guarantee. Odvar Norli is therefore right in a paradoxical way when he says that with Reagan in office there would be no dual-track decision, because then the Europeans would probably in an entirely different way have felt secure under the American guarantee. This was not the case after Vietnam and Watergate.

There are other paradoxes as well. We hear, as legitimation of the Labor Party's view of nuclear weapons, that Americans as well advocate freezing and oppose deployment in Western Europe. They should be OK, as it were, then. However, these Americans are those least concerned about the Soviet threat to the United States and least concerned about foreign affairs and American guarantees to other countries, and on the whole use of military means.

In reality, the debate concerns the role of the United States in the defense of Western Europe. The most important disagreement exists between those who desire and those who do not desire an American nuclear guarantee for Western Europe, not between the United States and Europe, as some would have it.

The Labor Party's representatives are therefore barking up the wrong tree when they seem to draw the conclusion of the INF [International Nuclear Forces] debate should find its solution in Europe's own defense, with respect to both opinion and the Soviet nuclear threat.

The idea of a European defensive alliance encounters considerable support here in Norway as well, provided we could find a place in it and it was implemented and credible.

In the current situation, however, it is tempting to assert that such a defense community would be established not because of but in spite of the INF matter.

For a party looked into its own inability to make decisions as concerns the strategic balance, such a flight from reality can of course be a party policy emergency exit.

In the first place, the problems would not go away if we attempted to solve them only between the Western European countries. How could we then guarantee the Western European countries who do not possess atomic weapons against them--in light of the fact that our nearest neighbor and adversary has them, and will have them as long as the United States has them? Would we have a separate European balance and would we accept a Soviet first strike capability and greater danger of nuclear blackmail and nuclear war limited to Europe? It is because the European countries cannot, for a variety of reasons, solve this dilemma that we have the American guarantee.

In the second place, the Atlantic "conflict" is most of all a political conflict among parties and political trends. If governments of various colors cannot find unifying solutions we can say farewell to cooperation with and among the great European countries. It should be added, by the way, that Atlantic relationships on the government level are better than they have been for a long time.

In the third place, the European handling of this matter shows so great divergencies of opinion on defense policies that Western European cooperation on defense policy appears as a very remote possibility. Strong governments and a broad unity of opinion will be required to carry forward so great an idea.

11,256

CSO: 3639/42

LEADING DAILY: LABOR PARTY HURTING NATO SOLIDARITY BY STAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Gamble with Security"]

[Text] It did not attract much attention that the AUF [Labor Youth Organization] chairman Egil Knudsen recently reiterated the SV's [Socialist Left Party] demand for abrogation of the COB [Collocated Operating Bases] agreement between Norway and the United States. For the AUF chairman merely affirmed what he himself has previously pointed out, namely that the left wing has been the driving power behind the Labor Party's change of course in security policy after the party lost government power and responsibility in 1981.

The questions we are here faced with are very serious. We are faced with a continual undermining of our country's connection with the Western defense alliance, NATO. This is what they are really doing, those who constantly demand that Norway divorce itself from its most important ally, the United States.

The gamble the Labor Party has engaged itself in is therefore a very dangerous one. Not only has the party entered into elaborate compromises with the left wing, but is letting itself be led by it. And this phalanx--which has the AUF leader as its spokesman, but which is also represented in the party's Storting group--for its part gambles by cleverly dealing from the bottom of the deck, at correspondingly high stakes.

An important chip in this is the continual and hollow assertion to the effect that all members of the Labor Party unanimously support Norwegian NATO membership. In light of this it was not to be expected that anybody of the Labor Party would vote for the SV's 'No to NATO' proposal in the Storting yesterday. They keep the mask on as long as possible, though their hearts probably beat for representative Ornhøi's initiative and intentions. Otherwise, the split in the Labor Party would have become glaringly apparent. Odvar Nordli, Storting president and former prime minister, pointed out the essence of the matter: "We must realize the obvious fact that we participate in NATO because in the current situation it provides the opportunity for a credible defense of our sovereignty and independence. We are not members out of consideration for others. We are in NATO for the sake of our own security."

This Nordli should have insisted upon strongly when his own party in reality threw NATO solidarity overboard when the missile matter was dealt with, for our membership in the Western alliance and the guarantees it contains is decisive for our ability to defend the freedom and independence of Norway.

As long as relations between East and West are characterized by tensions, then firmness, resoluteness and stability are in the interest both of NATO and our own country. The forces of the Left see this and wish to change it. The internal challenge to our security policy calls for constantly meeting this challenge.

11,256

CSO: 3639/42

HB PUSHES FOR CONDEMNATION OF 'STATE TORTURE'

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 13 Dec 83 p 4

[Text] Bilbao--The Herri Batasuna [Popular Front] party in Abanto and Ciervana has proposed a motion concerning torture to be debated in next Friday's plenum, in which the municipality is asked to "condemn torture as a method and practice used by the state," and it also asks them "to cooperate with those organizations which are fighting against the practice of torture by publicly denouncing it, and for copies of this agreement to be sent to all the political parties, institutions and organizations which are dedicated to the struggle against torture in the Spanish state."

Herri Batasuna's motion, which concludes with the requests quoted above, reads as follows: "During this past week there has been public confirmation that torture is going on in the Spanish state, and that the torturers receive cooperation from the state and its apparatus in their daily work.

"On one hand, the annual report of the Spanish Association for Human Rights was published, and in his presentation the president of the Justice Committee of the Spanish Congress of Deputies, Pablo Castellanos, a PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] deputy, admitted that torture goes on in the Spanish state.

"Furthermore, the sentence handed down against various members of the police who had the Basque revolutionary militant, Joseba Arregui, in their custody was made public.

"This sentence, far from admitting that Joseba Arregui died as a result of the torture which he received, absolves the police who were on trial; and it protects the practice of torture throughout the whole process of this case, giving among other reasons the statement that no facilities were given for clarifying who, how, etc., interrogated Arregui, with the apparatus of the state protecting those who murdered him.

"Let us make it clear that the expression 'murdered' was the one used by all the Basque political parties, and other Spanish parties established in the Basque Country, which are aware that the practice of torture and its consequences have been denounced countless times and in different ways by the Basque people, who are the ones to whom it is applied most cruelly,

not only to its most outstanding fighters, but to anyone whatsoever of its members who may be arrested--as Basque Left or the PCE recently reported when a town councillor in San Salvador del Valle was arrested some years ago, or as the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] has done in certain cases, or as HB does almost daily, or the long list of persons who have passed through police headquarters, etc.

"The purpose of torture is to destroy the person who is subjected to this practice, and also to break the capacity for resistance of the people as a whole, creating fear, passivity, and in short, encouraging destruction and repression.

"Keeping in mind that when there is no enforcement of internationally recognized rights, such as the assistance of an attorney for a prisoner from the moment he is arrested, the placing of those arrested at the disposal of judicial authority and not that of the police, etc...there is more opportunity for the practice of torture, and this is aggravated by the application of special laws, which are already in themselves doubtfully democratic, such as the Anti-terrorist Law or the new legislation which has been prepared to this effect in the Spanish state.

"This legislation, as the Anti-terrorist Law did previously, will encourage the practice of torture, and will end by finding the person who is tortured guilty--of a crime which in many cases he will not be accused of because it does not exist. As an example of this kind of accusation, we can cite the case of Esteban Muruetagoiena, the doctor from Oiartzun, who according to information supplied by international organizations died because of the treatment he received in police custody, and who, strangely enough, was freed without charges being placed against him."

8131

CSO: 3548/147

ETA PLACES EXPLOSIVES AT MILITARY BOMB RANGE

Las Bardenas Reales Targeted

Madrid ABC in Spanish 17 Dec 83 p 19

[Article by Jose Ramon Unzue]

[Text] Pamplona--A volunteer member of the air force, probably recruited by the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] after he joined the military service, placed four explosive devices in the administrative and maintenance center of the Las Bardenas Reales Bomb Range early yesterday morning. The airman, Miguel Angel Gil Carrera, age 19, made use of the opportunity of his serving on a night patrol to carry out his action.

Two of the bombs exploded, injuring three enlisted men and two officers stationed at the post, and causing serious material damage to the installations. The Civil Guard was able to deactivate the third device, which was composed of 10 kilos of "plastic-2." This undoubtedly prevented a catastrophe, since it had been placed under the propane gas storage tank.

The ETA-military claimed responsibility for planting the devices in a telephone call to a Guipuzcoa newspaper. In the call, the speaker stated that there still were four devices that have not been located, but it seems that this has not been confirmed.

The explosions destroyed part of the communications building, the kitchens, the latrines, the mess hall, as well as the garages and most of the vehicles which were parked there. Lt Eduardo Faire Soria received injuries to one hand; the duty lieutenant, one corporal and two enlisted men also received minor injuries. All five were taken to the Nuestra Senora de la Milagrosa Clinic in Tudela, but the only ones admitted were the two enlisted men: Jose Angel Verges, age 19, a native of the Zaragoza town of Pinsoro, who suffered two wounds--in the scalp and cheek--which were not considered serious; and Jesus Jimenez Navascues, born in Cintruenigo (Navarra), who was injured in the neck by the shock wave. His condition is not serious.

Night Patrol

The chief commandant of the Zaragoza Air Region told ABC that the man responsible for the events was Miguel Angel Gil Cervera, a volunteer airman in the Las Bardenas bombing detachment. He was a native of Pamplona.

It all began when the alleged terrorist was carrying out his patrol and security duties on the outskirts of the military enclosure together with another companion. At a given moment, with the help of some unknown person, he assaulted and gagged the other sentry, then placed four explosive charges, of which only two actually exploded. A third, placed under the propane storage tank, was deactivated by Civil Guard specialists under the command of Sgt Monge. The fourth one still has not been located, although it appears that it was buried under the wreckage of the garage.

Before the explosion occurred, the traitor sentry called the barracks switchboard from one of the eight telephones inside the base warning them about what was going to happen. Then he immediately fled in his accomplice's car, taking with him his automatic weapon and that of his companion. Both weapons, of the Z-70 type, were later found by the Civil Guard in the vicinity of the base.

In spite of the warning, there was not enough time to evacuate the place completely. The explosion struck three airmen who were in the communications center as ordered, and two of the officers who were directing the evacuation. Some 60 persons were in the barracks, although the usual complement is 90 troops and 15 officers and noncommissioned officers.

At this time, Civil Guard personnel are combing the area in search of the commandos, while inside the base they are beginning the work of clearing away the wreckage and searching for the device which still has not been located. Both the companions of the alleged terrorist and military circles are surprised that the ETA p-m VIII Assembly blamed a Basque newspaper for the attack.

An Ordinary Soldier

"Miguel was just another one of our companions. There are only a few of us here, and we all know each other very well," one of the wounded soldiers who remains under observation in the Tuleda La Milagrosa Clinic commented to us. "There was nothing about him that stood out. The truth is that we are very surprised, and we still can't explain to ourselves how this kind of thing could have happened. We don't know exactly what happened, but here they told us that we could all have been blown up."

Throughout the morning, relatives of airmen have coje to the base to find out about the condition of their sons, since communications remain cut off. The relatives of the injured soldiers, on their part, do not wish to make any statements.

Portrait of Military Perpetrator

Madrid ABC in Spanish 17 Dec 83 p 20

[Text] Madrid--Miguel Angel Gil Carrera, age 19, a masonry worker, born in and resident of Pamplona, joined the air force as a volunteer last 15 April. Therefore he is part of the second 1983 draft, and had chosen the Bardenas Reales Bomb Range out of other possible posts. According to sources in Air Force Headquarters, the enlistment application of this airman underwent the usual investigation, without any previous activity which could cause suspicion being discovered.

The data collected at the time by the SIL [Internal Information Service] about the personality of Miguel Angel Gil showed that he was qualified to be admitted as a volunteer, and in view of the fact that he was a resident of Pamplona it did not seem strange that he chose the Bomb Range as the place to carry out his military service, although most volunteers in this area prefer the Zaragoza Air Base.

It is thought that the airman was recruited by the ETA after he joined the air force, but it is possible that he moved in "abertzales" (patriotic) circles for some time before that, a fact which the Information Services inadvertently missed. One thing that is certain is that the attack was prepared and coordinated from outside. Thus, an unknown person helped the soldier to overcome and gag his companion on the patrol. This person also took charge of delivering the explosives to him, and stayed waiting for him to help him flee.

Also other ETA members phoned the Tudela Police Station announcing that the explosives had been placed.

According to his companions, Miguel Angel Gil had behaved normally during the 10 months that he had been a soldier; he did not take part in political conversations or discussions, and managed not to stand out particularly.

The Bomb Range administrative and maintenance center is an isolated place, and it is a great sacrifice for the officers and men to be stationed there. On the occasion of the recent autumn maneuvers, which were attended by His Majesty Juan Carlos I, the air force staff commended the whole base for the dedication and quality of its services. Really, the spirit of the men "was very high," according to military sources.

The Bardenas Bomb Range has always been one of the "propaganda objectives" of the ETA, as well as of regional and local groups of the extreme Left. For this reason, security in the area was stricter than in other places. The same sources admitted that "the infiltration of a traitor into our ranks was one of the risks we had anticipated, but also it was one of the most difficult to prevent. Yesterday a man took action against his own comrades who had put their own security in his hands."

Everything indicates that no suspicion had existed about the "traitor sentry." Terrorists who join the military service usually obtain information for the gang about time schedules and habits of officers, and about installations and weapons.

KOHEN ON TRNC ONE MONTH AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 83 p 2

[Commentary by Sami Kohen in the column "Looking at the World": "One Month Later"]

[Text] The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] is one month old today. The first 30 days of a state which has declared its independence may not be reckoned as an important period of time. But this short period does have some significance for the point of view of a state whose birth was accompanied by such labor pains--as was the case with the TRNC--demonstrating the extent to which it can resist efforts aimed at suffocating it and proving its "ability to survive."

When looking at it from this perspective, it is quite clear that the new baby's health is good and encouraging.

The intense efforts expended during this month to put an end to its existence, to view it as non-existent or to cause it to be viewed as non-existent have, for the most part, proven ineffective.

The storm of controversy that broke in the first days after its arrival on the world scene began to subside and the world's attention turned to other, more worrisome problems and crises.

Today, one month later, the Cyprus crisis furor has died down. The island is quiet and life is going on as usual in both sectors.

It was not difficult to predict that the declaration of independence would raise a hue and cry.

And indeed, immediately afterward the Greek Cypriot administration and the Greek government wasted no time in stirring up a storm in a number of international forums, particularly in the UN, and in a number of foreign capitals.

In the first month there were developments which worried Turks. In the UN Security Council an overwhelming majority decided not to accept, not to recognize the legitimacy of the TRNC and demanded an end to its existence.

A number of countries, with the US and Great Britain heading the list, have made statements holding a similar position.

The recent Commonwealth summit in New Delhi was an international forum that the Greek Cypriots appealed to immediately after the UN. Through the efforts of Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, this conference, comprised primarily of independent countries, placed a section in its communique which came out sharply against the Turkish Cypriots' declaration of independence. However even this statement did not go much beyond the UN Security Council decision.

Thus the appeals and attacks of Kyprianu and Papandreou have not been effective and have even backfired. When the Greek prime minister tried to raise the question in NATO, he got his comeuppance from Luns. The alliance was not the place to air this kind of disagreement and complaining. Indeed, this topic was not addressed in the NATO communique.

Papandreou also wanted to try his chances in the EEC which met in Athens. When for the first time the Common Market partners could not reach agreement on economic matters, the meeting broke up without publishing a communique. The Cyprus issue was quickly lost in the confusion.

And finally at last week's Islamic Conference, instead of accepting the proposals of countries like Algeria, Libya and Syria which generally support the Greek Cypriot position--proposals which they wanted to be based on the UN Security Council decision--a more positive draft decision proposed by Pakistan was accepted. Although it is true that this decision does not recognize the legality of the TRNC, it essentially defends the principle of equality between the island's two communities and it calls for the beginning of negotiations based on the principle of federation. Furthermore, it stresses Islamic Conference solidarity with the Turkish Cypriots. Doubtless, these statements were the exact opposite of what Kyprianou--and Papandreou--wanted and desired.

Although the month-old TRNC has not yet been officially recognized and has not been supported by most countries, it is successfully carrying on the struggle to survive.

Undoubtedly danger still exists. Papandreou now speaks of a long struggle. The Greek Cypriots and Greeks will rush about here and there to keep the question alive. Within the week, Greece will bring up the matter at the EEC Ministerial Council. Next month the Greek Cypriot administration will appeal again to the UN. Later, when the US Congress reconvenes, the Greek-Greek Cypriot lobby will go on the attack.

In other words, critical weeks are still ahead. The problems in this area are among the matters that will most occupy the newly-formed Ozal government. Nevertheless, the new government has an opportunity in that after all that has happened it can come up with new approaches to the question and with bold initiatives.

This could both frustrate the Greek Cypriot-Greek maneuvering and create new opportunities for a solution.

MINORITY COMMUNIST MP KUOPPA ON SOVIET PACT, CRUISE MISSILES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] "Especially now that a threat has appeared to use our airspace in an attack against the Soviet Union, one should investigate, with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance as a starting point--together with our ally--how the threat the euromissiles involve could be avoided. This is necessary for the security of both Finland and the north-eastern borders of the Soviet Union.

This is the exact wording presented by Parliament Member Mikko Kuoppa last Saturday at the Finland-Soviet Union Alliance Congress in Helsinki. The MTV [Commercial Television] news and several newspapers have interpreted this as a sign of military consultations.

Kuoppa himself says that he did not talk about such consultations but about joint investigations.

Chairman of the Finnish Communist Party Jouko Kajanoja had already had time to disassociate himself from Kuoppa's statement, but he is said to have used the wording "in case Kuoppa would have called for military consultations".

Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has not wanted to comment on the statement but referred to his own presentations of the past few weeks.

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CSO: 3650/78

PARTY LEADERS CAUTIOUS ON AALTO'S CALL FOR CP IN GOVERNMENT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 Dec 83 p 13

[Text] Secretary General Arvo Aalto's (CP) call in Oulu about Communist reparticipation in the Cabinet after the communal elections in the fall of 1984 has been commented on by the Social Democrat and Center Party leaders.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa refers to the traditional leftist collaboration that the Social Democrats are prepared to promote also within the Cabinet. He emphasizes, however, that the Communist Party itself should clarify its position.

Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has based his commentary on the CP congress decision in Rovaniemi when it was brought up that a broadening of the Cabinet would be desirable. Now it seems to Vayrynen that a broadening of the Cabinet both toward the right and the left would be possible for the Center Party.

It has been said that Aalto's call was met with varying satisfaction within the Communist Party. It is considered by some people to be in conflict with CP Chairman Jouko Kajanoja's speech at the last Central Committee meeting, where he, among other things, emphasized the unification efforts of the opposition.

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PROPOSAL BY CP SECRETARY FOR INCLUSION IN CABINET DISCUSSED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Is the Cabinet Stretching Toward the Left?"]

[Text] CP Secretary General Arvo Aalto's proposal that the SKDL [the Finnish People's Democratic League] should be included in the Cabinet, is commented on by Bjorn Mansson who states that there should be stronger reasons for a broadening of the Cabinet in the opposite direction, if the basis should be broadened at all.

Squeezed between the weekend and the Independence Day was naturally an uneventful day in regard to domestic politics. In the resulting shortage of news CP Secretary General Arvo Aalto created attention by proposing in a TV interview that the SKDL should, after the communal elections of next fall, reenter the Cabinet collaboration.

The statement was actually just a logical follow-up of the speech given by Aalto on Saturday at the CP district committee meeting in Oulu. He then warned his own party to voluntarily "give up its position" in the traditional leftist-center collaboration in the Parliament and the Cabinet. According to Aalto there is a risk that not only the SMP [the Finnish Rural Party] but may be even the Conservative Party might replace the SKDL as the collaboration partner of the Social Democrats and the "Center-Conservatives."

When it comes to eliminating the hindrances for the leftist-center collaboration "we have no use for revolutionary rambling", said Aalto and hereby clearly addressed the party minority. And he added that "only those who have no sense for reality" believe that you can participate in the collaboration of the democratic forces just by arranging mass activities."

It was no coincidence that it was Aalto who threw out a feeler. He is known as a devoted spokesman for the collaboration line and a few years ago he drove some dogmatic Communists out of their minds with his talk about the so called historic compromise. When Prime Minister Sorsa recently in his speech before the SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party] Party Council listed Communists who are willing to collaborate, he typically mentioned Aalto, together with SKDL chairman Kalevi Kivisto and former CP chairman Aarne Saarinen.

Arvo Aalto is not alone within the SKDL/CP in his opinion in regard to the Cabinet matter. It is obvious that, among others, Kivisto, Saarinen and SKDL Secretary Jorma Hentila are in principle representing the same line, although they have recently chosen a low profile. In a big interview in KANSAN UUTOSSET on Saturday veteran Arvo Hautala expressed his regret that the Communists left the Cabinet a year ago. The collaboration between the workers' parties requires, according to Hautala, that both parties are included in the Cabinet or that both of them are in opposition. Since Hautala hardly means that it would be realistic to get the Social Democrats put into the opposition, he obviously wants to have the SKDL in the Cabinet.

CP chairman Jouko Kajanoja has, on the other hand--most recently at the Central Committee meeting a couple of weeks ago--strongly emphasized the opposition position as a prerequisite for the ongoing unification process within the party. Since Kajanoja is pushing hard, a reaction of the type that Aalto's and Hautala's statements represent was to be expected. Both within and outside the CP there are many people who are of the opinion that the efforts to unify the party are too much dictated by the minority.

Several opinion polls have confirmed that the Communists' voters' support has not at all increased while the party has been in opposition, more to the contrary. The bottom number in the Parliament election was no coincidence. It is natural that the more revisionist elements within the party in this situation will ask themselves if it is not best to accept the situation and request to be included in the Cabinet. It is beginning to get hold in the opposition.

It would, however, be surprising if the opinion that is geared toward collaboration within the SKDL/CP would be able to stand up within their own ranks. Arvo Aalto speaks realistically about "eliminating hindrances."

He does not say it directly, but it seems obvious that one such hindrance is the CP base Jouko Kajanoja, whose entire strategy seems to be based on the party's gathering its ranks. An agonizing debate about inclusion in the Cabinet would certainly effectively sabotage all unification efforts before the party congress next year. It is not impossible that Arvo Aalto made his move well aware of this. That would mean that he is far from satisfied with the expressions that the unification efforts have turned into.

In regard to the possibilities of gaining sympathy for the invitations to collaborate beyond the own party ranks the timing of Aalto's move was indeed as such well chosen. The two weak points of the current Cabinet basis, the lack of a qualified majority in the Parliament and the difficulties of the SMP to keep up the pace, have clearly been revealed during the Parliament handling of the Cabinet's budget proposal.

It would still be surprising if Aalto's invitation would be taken seriously by the Cabinet parties. Aalto explicitly speaks about a "broadening" of the Cabinet base to the left, not that SKDL would replace, for example, SMP A Cabinet with both the troublemaker SMP and a deeply divided SKDL/CP

would certainly not be high on the wish list of the Social Democrats, the Center Party or the Swedish People's Party.

And a cabinet where SKDL replaces SMP is hard to accomplish, already because of Social Democrats' and the Center Party's locked positions in regard to the Cabinet's internal power relations.

Arvo Aalto's move has anyway duly been commented on by both Prime Minister Sorsa and Foreign Minister Vayrynen. Both of them repeat their parties previous standpoints. Vayrynen can refer to the fact that the Center Party in accordance with a decision in Rovaniemi is ready to discuss a broadening of the Cabinet base both to the left and to the right. Sorsa emphasizes, as he should, the need for collaboration between the leftist parties. But first SKDL has to internally clarify its position in regard to the Cabinet collaboration, according to Sorsa and he naturally hereby hits the nail on the head.

Typical for the locked positions in our parliamentary pattern, is however, that neither Sorsa nor Vayrynen have seen any reason to point out that there might be stronger reasons that speak for the broadening of the Cabinet base in a completely different direction. The budget agreement with the rightist opposition indicates--despite of all fumbling from that direction--that this is rather where the Cabinet can count on support.

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PAPERS AROUND COUNTRY REJECT CALL FOR CRUISE MISSILE TALKS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial Opinion: "Daily Discussion in Anticipation of Paavo Vayrynen's Moscow Trip"]

[Text] The minority Communist Parliament Member Mikko Kuoppa has, before Paavo Vayrynen's trip to Moscow, proposed that Finland and the Soviet Union should, in accordance with the second article of the VSB [Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance] treaty initiate consultations because of the threat represented by the euromissiles. Several newspapers pay attention to the move in their editorials on Independence Day. It is pointed out that military negotiations would now further increase the tension in the Nordic countries while Finland would also become involved in the conflicts of the superpowers. It is also noted that Communist Party Chairman Jouko Kajanoja had explained that Kuoppa was speaking only for himself. The way the statement was presented in television also caused some surprise.

Situation Worsened

Chief editor Teuvo Mallinen emphasizes in his column in KALEVA that Finland has to rely on its own abilities in regard to the warding off of euro-missiles. Mallinen notes Mikko Kuoppa's thought that the VSB Treaty consultations should be initiated and he continues:

"If our country would decide on some kind of preliminary consultations as Kuoppa suggests, it would be a disadvantage for the international situation, for the Soviet Union and for Finland. Then the military tension on the Nordic countries would no doubt increase in a way that would be reflected in the entire development of the peace issue in Europe and it would seriously harm the basis for it. Finland would at the same time get pulled into the interest conflicts of the superpowers and say goodbye to its neutrality policies.

"It is under all circumstances wise and useful that Finland keeps its situation in its own hands, as Foreign Minister Vayrynen had said.

"One way to express this could and should be that Finland's air defense become more effective--regardless of the fact that especially parliament

member Mikko Kuoppa and the political line that he represents have not even been able to accept that the defense forces have bought vehicles from the Soviet Union. That was the reason why the Communist Party/the Finnish People's Democratic League left the government."

Finland is Aware of its Obligations

Minority Communist Mikko Kuoppa's idea that Finland and the Soviet Union should initiate consultations based on the VSB Treaty because of the military situation that has now arisen when the euromissiles have arrived in Europe, is clearly going too far, according to VAASA of the Conservative Party:

"Parliament member Kuoppa, who with the reasoning behind his proposal is ready to bury even Finland's neutrality because of the euromissiles, wants that Finland and the Soviet Union reach an agreement about measures brought about by the new situation.

"Finland is aware of its position and its obligations and acts in this awareness without dramatics. This involves work to promote slackening of tension internationally and measures to defend Finland's own area. It would be possible also for Kuoppa and his kindred souls to make a greater contribution within this allotment and in the spirit of the VSB Treaty without giving speeches which outside our borders might give rise to harmful speculations about Finland's position".

Why Right Now?

According to minority Communist Mikko Kuoppa the euromissiles have created a new situation, where Finland's possibilities of staying out of the threat from the superpowers has become increasingly questionable, notes chief editor Olle Spring of VASTRA NYLAND.

"Kuoppa himself must answer why he is bringing up these articles right now. For others his drive must seem as an excess in self-defense which is not and should not become imminent or even come into question. President Paasikivi stated already on 9 April 1948 in a radio speech to his and Finland's people that the obligation to negotiate by Article 2 of the VSB Treaty 'will apply when a threat of attack against Finnish territory has been manifested. The word "manifested" involves a mutual expression of willingness.' Such a threat has not been manifested and we should at least not rush to express any rash, panicky 'expressions of willingness' and even less ask the other party of the Treaty to do so."

"Coward"

AAMULEHTI of the Conservative Party calls Member of Parliament Mikko Kuoppa a "coward."

"The Communist Member of Parliament Mikko Kuoppa has clearly expressed the same thing that the Stalinist TIEDONANTAJA has many times indicated or

proposed: military consultations based on the VSB Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. There are, however, no reasons now for such consultations, because nothing and nobody has threatened to attack Finland or the Soviet Union through Finland's territory.

"One should not fantasize about the shepherd and cry for help when there is no wolf. And not even on the basis of the Treaty should one cry for foreign help. That is coward propaganda."

"Another Mikko"

Chief editor Bo Stenstrom uses the above headline in ABO UNDERRATTELSE.

"Member of Parliament Mikko Kuoppa (minority Communist) has managed to take the sting out of his apparently TIEDONANTAJA-inspired thoughts about how we should secure our neutrality through consultations with the Soviet Union about a second-order weapons like the cruise missiles.

"One should not exaggerate what a minority Communist says on the spur of the moment, even if it happens prior to the Foreign Minister's trip to the East, but some reflections come inevitably into mind.

"Being a member of parliament should as soon as possible be classified as intellectual work, so that also members of parliament would have to think before they act.

"The other thing is that television journalism should also not only give information about what is happening, but also give the right proportions and the context. Now the 10 o'clock news chose to give an advance push that created sensation and the news broadcast did not present the matter with the right proportions.

"The third thing is that it is good that a Kajanoja and a Saarinen are correcting their black sheep--but the Foreign Minister of the country should also in such a case be able to give clear information".

The Soviet Union and Sweden as well as Finland

The way chief of the main staff, vice-admiral Jan Klenberg has stated, it is very important for the Soviet Union that the long west coast of the Baltic with the territorial waters should not be used by powers inimical to the Soviet Union, emphasizes ETELASUOMEN SANOMAT.

"The poorer the relationship between Sweden and the Soviet Union, the more active the Soviet submarine activity in the Baltic will probably be. The resulting distrust will even reach Finland. President Koivisto had full reason to hope that Sweden would have equally good relations with the Soviet Union as Finland does, although the Swedish newspapers flared up over this issue".

The Nordic Countries an Easily Ignited Powder Keg

The result of the development has been that a small nation like Finland has become increasingly dependent on the policies of the great powers, according to BORGABLADET, where chief editor Rolf Garrielson writes:

"The military strategic importance of the Nordic countries right now is essential and the consequence of that is that Finland's security to a larger extent than before has been linked to what is happening in the area of the relations between the superpowers.

A well-informed representative for the Ministry of Defense stated the other day at the annual meeting of the east Uusimaa Paasikivi Association, that the Nordic countries might turn out to be a fairly easily ignited powder keg in a possible crisis situation. That is how important this part of Europe has become for the military blocks. Whether we want it or not the Nordic countries and the surrounding sea regions have ceased to be militarily and politically uninteresting.

"Finland's position as an independent nation is not threatened. But since the dark clouds of superpower politics now easier than before might cast a shadow also over the Nordic countries, it has become increasingly important for Finland to consistently and powerfully pursue security policies that also in a changed global political situation have proved to suit the purpose".

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DETAILS OF PROPOSED MINISTRY CHANGES, REORGANIZATION

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 11 Dec 83 p 2

/Article by Mikh. Dimitriou/

/Text/ The government's strategic orientation over the next 2 years includes the abolition of seven ministries (Ministries of Finance, Public Order, Culture, Research and Technology, Energy and Natural Resources, Merchant Marine and Northern Greece), the restructuring of five others (Ministries to the Prime Minister, Labor, Education, National Economy and Commerce) as well as the establishment of one new ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations.

These proposals are contained in a many-paged special study prepared by a task force composed of 12 officials of the government and PASOK. They prepared the study on instructions by a ministerial group headed by Minister to the Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas and Minister of Interior Gennimatas.

The results of the study have been communicated to the government leadership and it is being said that it has been adopted in large part. Prime Minister Papandreou will shortly come to a definite decision on the implementation of all that has been proposed. At any rate, these institutional changes are not linked to any government reshuffle. Also, their implementation will be spread out up to the 1985 elections.

The study has been classified as "Top Secret" and looks to the restructuring of government operations on the basis of "providing the ministries with a staff orientation and a merging of programs" in accordance with four parameters: organization, functionality, personnel efficiency and relations with citizens). The following are the specific recommendations:

Ministry to the Prime Minister

It is recommended that it be converted into a central agency for overall public administration with the objective being a check over effectiveness and better planning. It is proposed that it be renamed Ministry of Public Administration with broad staff and coordination jurisdictions.

It is proposed that (1) the General Secretariat of Greek Emigration be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (2) the General Press Secretariat and the overseeing of the mass media be transferred to the Ministry of Interior; and

(3) the Auditing Assembly be transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Also, the foreign press offices and the competent central services are to be subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council would be responsible to the prime minister.

The General Secretariat of Athletics and the services of the Under Secretariat of the New Generation are to be transferred to the Ministry of Education that will be renamed.

It is also suggested that the EOT /Greek Tourist Organization/ be transferred to the Ministry of Commerce that will be significantly expanded.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

It is being recommended that all European affairs (EEC) be transferred to it through the transfer of certain services and officials from the Ministry of National Economy.

Ministry of National Defense

It remains as is. It has been simply recommended that certain civilian personnel be transferred from the staffs to other civil services.

Ministry of National Economy

The proposal of the ministerial committee is that the Ministry of Finance be merged into it. Over the past few years, the latter has been converted into a purely executive apparatus. It is also suggested that the Postal Savings Banks come under the Ministry of National Economy. Up to now they are under the Ministry of Communications.

On the other hand, it is proposed that the Ministry of National Economy should lose certain jurisdictions that would be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (European affairs) or to the new Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations (bilateral relations).

Ministry of Interior

It is recommended that besides the General Press Secretariat, all the services of the Ministry of Public Order and the Ministry of Northern Greece be transferred to the Ministry of Interior. (It is recommended that these two ministries be abolished). Also, the Port Corps to be transferred from the Ministry of Merchant Marine that is also to be abolished.

Ministry of Public Works

It is proposed that the Organization of School Buildings be transferred from the Ministry of Education, the land improvement project services from the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the "Labor House" from the Ministry of Labor. Also, that the Fund for Financing and Construction of Judicial Buildings be transferred from the Ministry of Justice and also certain technical services from the

Ministry of Culture. It is also proposed that all state agencies and services dealing with the construction of public works be transferred to the Ministry of Public Works that is to be greatly expanded.

Ministry of Justice

It is recommended that its jurisdiction over the financing and construction of judicial buildings be taken away and that it take over Auditing Assembly.

Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs

The ministry is to be changed into an expanded form and it is proposed that it be renamed Ministry of National Education, Culture and Youth. It is also being proposed that all the services of the Under Secretariat of the New Generation and of the Ministry of Culture that is to be abolished be transferred to it. At the same time the School Buildings Organization would be taken away from the Ministry of National Education. Also to be transferred to it would be the antiquities services, fine arts and letters and cultural relations.

Ministry of Finance

This ministry is to be abolished and its services transferred to the Ministry of National Economy. It is being proposed that the General State Chemical Laboratory come under the Ministry of Health.

Ministry of Agriculture

It is proposed that the technical (construction) services be transferred to the Ministry of Public Works. On the other hand, it is proposed that various services of the Ministry of Commerce (chemists, laboratory technicians, etc.) be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture for food quality controls purposes. At any rate, it is recommended that the ministry expand its activities in the provinces.

Ministry of Culture and Sciences.

Besides being abolished, it is proposed that the personnel and responsibilities be greatly decentralized. With the transfer of most of its responsibilities to the Ministry of Education, certain ones that are related to cultural activities are to be transferred to the New Generation sector. As for other responsibilities (except for certain technical ones) of the Ministry of Culture, certain ones, such as those dealing with scientists, it is proposed that they be transferred to a special new agency that is being proposed to replace the Ministry of Research and Technology.

Ministry of Physical Planning, Housing and Environment

It is proposed that its present responsibilities be increased, specifically that services for the protection of and controls over the environment and the quality of life be transferred to it from the Ministries of Energy and Health.

Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources

It is proposed that it be abolished and its services dispersed to the Ministry of Physical Planning, the new Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations (procurement of liquid fuels) and above all to the Ministry of Commerce.

Ministry of Research and Technology

It is proposed that it be abolished and replaced by a new agency, the Research and Sciences Center that will be responsible to the prime minister. Also to be subject to this center will be certain areas dealing with scientists now in the Ministry of Culture.

Ministry of Commerce

It is proposed that its services and staff responsibilities be greatly expanded and that it be renamed Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Coming under this ministry will be the "natural resources" sector of the present Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. It is also proposed that the loose controls over the EOT come under the jurisdiction of this ministry.

Ministry of Labor

It is proposed that its responsibilities be fully clarified and that it be involved only in labor matters. It is also proposed that the "Labor House" be transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and the OAED /Labor Force Employment Organization be transferred to the Ministry of National Economy.

Ministry of Health and Welfare

It is proposed that the welfare sector of this ministry be transferred to the Ministry of Social Insurance and that the General State Chemical Laboratory be transferred to the new Ministry of Health.

Ministry of Social Insurance

It is proposed that its responsibilities be expanded and that it be renamed Ministry of Social Insurance and Welfare, with the NAT /Seamen's Retirement Fund also coming under its jurisdiction.

Ministry of Communications

It is proposed that its responsibilities be expanded (through a merger with the Ministry of Merchant Marine), with more transfers of services and responsibilities to the provinces.

It is proposed that it be renamed Ministry of Communications and Merchant Marine and that a deputy minister be responsible for the merchant marine aspect of the ministry. It is also proposed that certain technical responsibilities of the ministry be transferred to the Ministry of Public Works.

Ministry of Public Order

It is proposed that it be abolished and its services come under the Ministry of Interior. At the same time, the YPEA /National Security Service/ would be abolished and the security services would be unified.

Ministry of Merchant Marine

Together with the subordination of this ministry's services to the Ministry of Communications, the OLP /Piraeus Port Authority/ would also be transferred to it, while the NAT would be transferred to the Ministry of Social Insurance.

Ministry of Northern Greece

It is proposed that the central service be abolished and that its responsibilities be transferred either to the Ministry of Interior or primarily to the regional administration of the nomes.

Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations

It is proposed that this new ministry be responsible for everything dealing with bilateral relations, trade and the procurement of liquid fuels.

It should be emphasized that both the proposal of the task force as well as other written recommendations for administrative changes do not refer to the replacement of ministers or deputy ministers. None of these documents (five in all) refers to any decrease or increase of deputy ministers. Their objective is the formulation of views and proposals for ministries and not for ministers or deputy ministers.

5671

CSO: 3521/129

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CDA/VVD RELATIONS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 10 Dec 83 pp 18-21

[Article by Frank Lafort: "Lubbers during CDA and VVD Reconciliation Day: 'Let us Stop Smashing the Glasses of the Economic Recovery'"; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] The big reconciliation day between the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] was celebrated last week at the Royal restaurant in the Hague. Also: a necessary meeting. As a matter of fact, Minister Ruding (Finance) does not intend to let a massive hole be shot in the government agreement.

After more than a year of working together to cover the flanks of the government policy of the Lubbers-Van Aardenne duo, they themselves got together for the first time last Tuesday (29 November 1983) at the Royal restaurant in the Hague: Dr J.H. Christiaanse, CDA parliamentary party leader in the First Chamber; Dr G. Zoutendijk, VVD parliamentary party leader in the Senate; Dr B. de Vries, CDA parliamentary party leader in the Second Chamber; E.H.T. M. Nijpels, VVD parliamentary party leader in the Second Chamber; J. Kamminga, VVD party president; and P. Bukman, CDA party president.

Because of their crammed **agendas**, it had been difficult to bring this company together. It had already been decided in September that such a meeting should take place quickly. Specifically as a sequel to the lunch attended by both parliamentary party presidents in the Senate and their two colleagues Nijpels and De Vries in the Second Chamber. One of the goals of the September meeting, hosted by Dr Christiaanse, was to improve the atmosphere between both coalition partners in the Second Chamber. An initiative which was imperative at the time. Prior to and following discussion of the Spring Memorandum in the Second Chamber, De Vries and Nijpels had regularly flown at each other in public. All of this to the great delight of the opposition. As late as early October, on the eve of the general political and financial considerations for 1984, in the Second Chamber, De Vries admitted that it was not all roses between the two parliamentary party presidents. De Vries commented: "Nijpels' style and mine are quite different. Also in terms of personality and character, and in our way of dealing with each other there are sometimes rough edges. But that is not disastrous; so far we have been able to do good business. Furthermore, it is certainly a good thing that the people notice that the VVD is different from the CDA."

The moment for the meeting at the Royal, now with Dr Zoutendijk as host, had unconsciously been well chosen. Lubbers' ministerial team had just faced the wrath of a large number of civil servants, whose tired leaders have probably no other alternative left this week than to bury the hatchet for 1984. According to a number of those who were present at the Royal, a funny accidental is the fact that the actions of the angry civil servants have driven the two government parties CDA and VVD even closer into each other's arms. Hence, no indecent word was spoken at the table in the Royal. Dr De Vries' razor sharp words of early October, to the effect that "the VVD is regularly guilty of low down stunt work. That is a risk factor for the coalition; the only thing is that the risks must remain manageable. If you begin to irritate one another, then the risks and the danger of work related accidents -- which nobody wanted very much -- become greater," were forgiven and forgotten. The sharp words were gone. Afterwards it became remarkably quiet around the coalition.

The attention of the CDA and the VVD was now claimed by the incensed civil servants. When the government policy, which is anchored in a government agreement, is under a frontal attack this does create a certain sense of solidarity. This feeling of "closing the ranks" is strengthened even further because in public opinion polls, both the Christian democrats and the liberals have to give up a large number of seats to the opposition. Until recently it looked as if only the CDA, devastated by internal difficulties, would have to pay the price, from an electoral point of view, for the administration's three track policy.

According to PvdA [Labor Party] member of parliament Jacques Wallage, in a statement published on 21 November in the PvdA organ VOORWAARTS, the transfer of disappointed CDA voters to the PvdA is in full swing now: "Recent research by Maurice de Hond shows a sizable direct crossover of CDA voters to the PvdA. By paying extra attention to this movement, a broadening of our electoral base could become a fact." Wallage also commented on how this former CDA electorate could be absorbed by the PvdA: "To provide a home for this group makes demands on our party culture, on paying attention to religion as a factor in politics, and on our willingness to nominate known representatives of that group as party candidates." In order to put an end to this decline in the opinion polls and especially to encourage their own cadres, the top leaders of the CDA -- that is to say Lubbers, De Vries and Bukman -- have since recently been conducting a /permanent campaign/.

A CDA caravan which, mindful of the recommendations of the CDA report "Recall and Response," is supposed to help clarify the government policy for the vacillating population. "It is specifically the actions of the administration which must be sold better," was also the unanimous opinion of the illustrious visitors at the Royal last Tuesday. The only question is: How? Those present did not have a ready made answer to this. Prime Minister Lubbers on the other hand, did. "Let us work with each other and not against each other," said Lubbers in Haarlem the day after the meeting at the Royal. His remarks were also meant for the four government personnel union federations. Lubbers said that their actions and intimidations have damaged the dialogue and the national economy. And this just now when the Dutch economy is hesitantly recovering. Lubbers: "Let us therefore stop smashing the glasses of that recovery ourselves."

De Vries and Lubbers are unanimous in their belief that this is also the main reason why the civil servants unions should get together as soon as possible with Minister Rietkerk (Internal Affairs) to negotiate the labor conditions for 1985 and 1986. And specifically, to prevent "the civil servants from becoming the closing entry in the budget, and to prevent once again many thousands of unemployed from being added in the market sector, and because young people also have a right to work." However, according to the civil servants unions, the love must come from both sides. They want to talk with the administration this month only if a concrete plan for 1985 and 1986 is presented in which the equal standing of the federations as negotiation partners is clearly determined. As a matter of fact, next year will be a /"lost year"/ for the unions anyhow, concludes among others the union newspaper ZIN from the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] Industrial Union. Behind the scene, the administration is conducting consultations with the four federations of government personnel, specifically the CMHA [expansion unknown], the Civil Servants Center, and the CCOOP [Christian Labor Union of Government and Educational Personnel], to achieve such a multi-year contract. The government can "buy" some social peace with this.

The question which preoccupies Minister Ruding (Finance) specifically is: at what cost? On 23 November, this minister angrily left a ministers meeting and Lubbers had to go personally to the Ministry of Finance to bring back Ruding, who disagreed with Minister Rietkerk's latest offer to the CMHA, the Civil Servants Center and the CCOOP. Minister Ruding also committed his objections to paper and sent them to the Council of Ministers. The main points in this document were:

- the national government cannot give any guarantees against forced dismissals;
- the shortening of the work week is a flexible phenomenon. Guarantees in 1985 and 1986 to omit general gross cuts of civil servants wages are hard to give;
- a high level of re-employment (80 percent) in exchange for a gross income offer of 3 percent and a reduction of the work week would mean extra savings of more than 1 billion guilders in 1985 and 1986;
- a 36 hour week by 1987 for government personnel, achieved via Friday afternoons off, would have disadvantageous effects on the economy. Dutch business and industry specifically want as much flexibility as possible in the reduction of the work week;
- an adequate escape clause must be built into the offer made by the government to the civil servants federations.

Hence, according to the Ministry of Finance, only under these marginal conditions is it possible to achieve a multi-year contract, which is not contrary to the government agreement, with the federations of government personnel. It has already been established now that these negotiations will not be easy ones. If the government does not succeed in reaching an agreement with the unions this month, then Minister Rietkerk will have to come up with a new package of measures for a new structure of consultations with the civil servants unions by February (1984). This proposal was launched last week by VVD parliamentary party leader Nijpels at the general members' meeting in Alkmaar. For example, at the time of the presentation of the Spring Memorandum, said

Nijpels, the administration could also introduce a plan in the Second Chamber concerning the level of civil servant wages, the pensions, the number of jobs, the secondary labor conditions, etcetera, for 1985. Then the Second Chamber would be able to provide a /provisional/ assessment of the government's intentions concerning the civil servants before the summer recess. Later on Minister Rietkerk could start consultations with the federations, in order that they not be faced with faits accomplis when the session of the States General is officially opened.

If, during the general considerations, the Second Chamber still wants to make amendments in the labor conditions package for civil servants, then it will need very good arguments, according to the liberal parliamentary party leader. He noted that his proposal does not affect the chamber of representatives' power of the purse, while the civil servants can really and openly negotiate with the largest employer.

If the outcome of the negotiations is that savings on salaries or on secondary labor conditions for government personnel are reduced, then it will be possible to absorb these "disappointments" in other budget items. The Christian democrats do not seem very enthusiastic about Nijpels' proposal. They are afraid that with the plan of the liberals, the civil servants would leave too great a mark on the level of public services, the secondary labor conditions and the number of public servants. The liberals are willing to pay this "price" for an open and real dialogue, as long as the goals of the government agreement are not interfered with.

In recent weeks, precisely the government agreement instrument of the CDA and the VVD has been heavily used as a target by such politicians as PvdA parliamentary party leader Den Uyl, D'66 [Democrats '66] parliamentary party President Engwirda, GPV [Reformed Political Union] parliamentary party leader Schutte and a few constitutional law scholars. Thus, even Prime Minister Lubbers' council advisor, Mr R.J. Hoekstra, advised parliament to simply eliminate the government agreement as an instrument for the formation of an administration. The editors of the second political yearbook were even more blunt in this respect. They noted: "In the Netherlands, government withdraws from political and social opposition. When critical noises are not listened to, the government's many calls for loyalty become idle words. When texts such as the royal speech do not make an impression on anyone, when attempts to support the policy by raising voices are doomed to failure beforehand, then the third possibility is the emergency exit: escape behavior, manifested in various forms of fraud and tax evasion, which affect the foundations of the state, and which have become more and more common and acceptable."

However, what all these critics are losing track of is the fact that the government agreement between the CDA and the VVD was put together by two working groups from both parties. Members of parliament who were elected directly by the people of the Netherlands. Hence: at its advent on 11 May 1973, the extra-parliamentary Den Uyl administration had one of the most detailed government agreements in parliamentary history. Anyone who would have dared to fiddle with that government agreement 10 years ago would quickly have been labeled "untrustworthy" by the current opposition leaders.

ERC, NE FINALIZING ELECTORAL PACT

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 15 Dec 83 p 9

[Article by M.A. Llinas]

[Text] Barcelona--Republican Left and National Left met yesterday to conclude proposals for an electoral pact which they have been negotiating these last weeks. According to what AVUI has been able to learn, Republican Left requested, among other conditions, that the electoral pact not be changed into a formal coalition.

All during the negotiations, National Left has been asking for this formal coalition, which ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia] apparently does not believe necessary and considers that by not making it, problems would be avoided which may arise once the elections using this formula are over. It also happens that ERC at present is a parliamentary party with 13 deputies and won 14 seats in the most recent autonomous [regional] elections, while National Left, for the time being, is still outside Parliament.

ERC maintained strongly tonight that the candidacy, in case agreement is reached, is to be presented only under the acronym or symbol of that party to the Electoral Board. In spite of that, ERC considers that the name of both parties would have to appear in the electoral publicity, as well as on the ballots, and that the whole electoral campaign could be waged in the name of both organizations.

The party of Heribert Barrera has already lived through electoral experiences similar to the one now being proposed with the first elections to the Senate, when together with the socialists, communists and independents they put together the candidacy for Catalan Understanding. On that occasion the socialists were the ones who presented it and it was not a formal coalition. Also the same experience was repeated in the "Catalonia, Democracy and Socialism" coalition for the Senate.

Lists

As for the position on the lists of the candidates of both parties, Republican Left proposed yesterday that the first candidate of Nationalist Left to the Barcelona district occupy third place and not fourth as it had

accepted up to now. In fact, according to the proposition that apparently will occur if agreement is reached, the NE would start with sixth place, since for each five members of ERC there would be one for Nationalist Left according to previous electoral results. The second place on the list would probably go to one of the two most outstanding members of this legislature, Joan Hortala, current spokesman to the Parliament, or Albert Alay. Thus therefore, Jordi Carbonell, the Nationalist Left candidate, would be third.

According to the proportion that out of each five places for the ERC, one goes to NE, then NE would have number 11 on the list for Barcelona and so forth and so on.

For the other districts, ERC last night proposed that the proportion be the same.

An Independent

In case agreement is reached within the next few days, there would also be a place reserved on the list for Barcelona for the National Left Group, which Felip Sole Sabaris sponsors. The negotiations with this body of independents, however, would take place after the agreement.

By late last night it did not seem that yesterday's meeting would be wholly decisive and the possibility of holding another meeting before the end of the coming week was not ruled out.

12448

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EDUCATION LAW PUTS CHURCH-STATE AT LOGGERHEADS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 16 Dec 83 p 11

[Article by Carlos Santos]

[Text] Some Bishops Want Dialogue With PSOE, While Others Prefer "War"

The Socialist Education Law is Dividing the Spanish Church

It would be an exaggeration to speak of schism, but no one can deny the existence of conflicts. It is a fact:

The Spanish Church is divided regarding the position which should be adopted concerning the socialist government.

A "hard line" sector, under the leadership of Monsignor Yanes, is opposed to and unwilling to accept dialogue.

A minority sector, under the moral leadership of Monsignor Jubany, champions an attitude of dialogue. This division has been reflected with regard to the Education Law (LODE)

worked out by the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party].

While the "hardliners" support or promote "war" in the streets, the "dialoguers" have succeeded in modifying the law. Their views have been defended in the Parliament.

Madrid--Since the socialists came to power, two distinctly different tendencies have begun to emerge within the Spanish Church hierarchy. One champions an attitude of dialogue with the new government. Another defends more belligerent theses. The existence of these two tendencies has come to light concerning education policy: in the "war of the catechisms" and in the current debate on the Education Law. It probably will soon be reflected in some change in the inner circle of leadership among the bishops.

The "hard" line is led by Elias Yanes, archbishop of Zaragoza and veteran candidate to the chairmanship of the Bishops' Conference. In the most recent elections he presented the most conservative candidacy, which was defeated with a slight edge by that of Diaz Marchan, bishop of conciliatory disposition.

Catechisms

Yanes, however, has kept the chairmanship of the Bishops' Committee on Education. From this platform, which affects very sensitive areas of the Christian community, he has devoted himself to waging war on his own, according to all signs, and even managed to irritate other bishops.

The first expression of this annoyance, of which DIARIO 16 has reliable proof, occurred during the last week in November, on the occasion of the last plenum of the Bishops' Conference. On that occasion, as sources close to the Conference have confirmed, Jubany criticized Yanes' actions during the "war of the catechisms."

The criticisms centered on the role played in that "war" by the Bishops' Committee on Education, over which Yanes presides. There was also criticism of the lack of information to the rest of the members of the Bishops' Conference.

A few bishops besides Jubany defended theses different from those of Yanes. One was apparently Monsignor Sebastian, secretary general of the conference.

As is clear from these occurrences, the "war of the catechisms" was a warlike episode in which the main part was played exclusively by Elias Yanes, without the blessing of the remaining bishops.

The difference in views among the bishops appears to be on several levels: Different idea or understanding of relations with the socialists, different perspectives on how to approach the task of evangelization, plus an internal problem, lack of information.

The lack of internal channels of information among the bishops allows an occasional committee, like the one on education, to make serious decisions unbeknown to the rest. This lack of information has had other repercussions. An occasional bishop on the periphery or the provincial of some religious order, have made discreet inquiries to the Ministry of Education asking for information on the LODE.

The LODE

In the field of education, the division taking shape among Spanish bishops has other repercussions: One sector of the Church is reevaluating the present and future of the network of religious schools. There is confirmation, first, of the meager results that these schools usually yield in the area of beliefs. Second, studies are being made of how the evangelizing work of the Church can return to its source, parish catechesis.

With the coming of the LODE, the existence of two lines of thought has become clear. A large sector of bishops is aligning with the most intransigent theses of the popular group and supports open warfare, within the Parliament and without. Another sector is making an effort to improve the law.

While Monsignor Yanes, who managed to connect the LODE to drug addiction, aims at the extreme position of the popular group [sic]. Monsignor Jubany is betting on the Catalan minority's liking for feasibility [posibilismo] and getting some of his theses to become law.

The contribution of the most open sector of the Church have come by way of several agencies or intermediaries. The so-called Tarragona branch of the Spanish bishops has maintained contacts with the Ministry of Education. But its theses, above all, have been brought to the Parliament by the deputies of the Catalan faction, in permanent dialogue with the representative organs of the Catalan clergy in the field of education.

This attitude of dialogue, especially where results are concerned, has made an impression on private education in the rest of Spain. CECE (Association of Private Schools) and FERE (Organization of Religious Educators) had surrendered in principle into the arms of the popular group, through which they channeled their proposals or nominations.

12448

CSO: 3548/150

KIBAR CALLS FOR MORATORIUM ON POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] No one can deny that we are in a period of transition from military to civilian government. I don't believe that giving credence to pompous statements or useless polemics would be a very patriotic thing to do during a period such as this. One is saddened by the fault finding of those who until the very recent past were clamoring for democracy. Would it not be better if we were to set aside partisanship for a while and jointly tackle the task of placing the new regime on solid foundations? Let us not forget that even after the elections we will be co-existing with certain idiosyncrasies stemming from the period of military leadership. While this is a reality that is inherent to Turkey, let us also not forget that democracy is the ultimate objective. The principle of democracy is one that has been agreed upon by all concerned, regardless of political orientation. It is clear that the most secure, permanent and expeditious means of achieving this objective involves unity during this period of transition. Who could possibly benefit from expressing doubt about the policies of a government that has not yet begun its task? How quickly have we forgotten the past? Let us wait until the government is formed, the cabinet is announced and the government's program is presented to the nation in parliament. Let us give them the chance to begin their work. After that, we can voice our concerns in a "constructive" tone. Let us not cause harm by rushing things.

Last week I read an article by my friend Metin Toker. While we have never been on the same political side for almost forty years, we have been able to agree as much as possible on certain ways to look at the country. In the process, we never lost our mutual respect. He expresses his thoughts so well in his article analyzing the Motherland Party that I felt pleasure in reading it. Had I written the article, there would have been some people who would have expressed skepticism.

In his article which looks at matters going as far back as 13 May 1950 and even as far as the reign of Abdulhamid, Toker looks

at the trait of skepticism as a common denominator. In my opinion, this trait is more an expression of patriotism and responsibility than it is a reflection of jealousy or an inability to get along. There can be nothing more natural than devoting more time to the party who currently forms the government. Since the actions of the two other parties could not really affect the outcome to any large extent, talking about the Motherland Party should be more an act of nationalism and less an act of partisanship.

We should all commend Turgut Ozal's intelligent, foreseeing and realistic attitude during the election of the Chairman of the Assembly. This is an attitude that will guide him well through future difficulties. These were the things that we were thinking about when we said that "we will be coexisting with certain idiosyncrasies stemming from the period of military leadership." Naturally, the President's demonstrated respect towards the will of the nation has also made a great contribution that is likely to continue in the future. Our nation does not like and has never liked tokenism. In this period of transition, Ozal and his party have removed all doubts, earned an important point and placed a solid cornerstone on the foundations of the new regime by their attitude during the election of the Assembly Chairman.

Those who describe the Motherland Party's current outlook as inexperienced with the intention of weakening the party are probably doing the party a service. In my opinion, such an accusation provides this party with an opportunity. The almost total absence of professional politicians within the party may be a long range advantage. May God help them.

9491
CSO:3554/95

ARCAYUREK LOOKS AHEAD TO LOCAL ELECTION BATTLE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 11 Dec 83 p 7

[Text] Turgut Ozal is being provided with numerous kinds of assistance from all levels of government. We are not merely conveying an impression and tangible examples can be provided.

Turgut Ozal had announced that he would reduce the number of cabinet positions. Having promised this, he soon found that there were constitutional obstacles in his path. The President could not ignore a violation of the constitution but also felt that Ozal should keep his promise. As a result, the President became Ozal's first source of help. The president caused presidential advisor Serif Gozubuyuk to become involved in the matter. Gozubuyuk who is an expert in public administration visited Ozal's home and explained to Ozal the difficulties inherent to reducing the number of ministers. Ozal saw that he was in a tight spot.

First a decision was made to follow legal avenues in reducing the number of ministers. This decision was followed by implementation when the National Security Council extended by six months the validity of an authorization bill that grants the government the right to reorganize public agencies. This was followed by the preparation of an action plan whereby Ozal would place 20 names on his cabinet list. This number would be equal to the number of ministers currently serving on the Council of Ministers. After having this list approved by the President the Council of Ministers would meet to combine certain ministries and abolish others while appointing as Minister of State any minister who would consequently lose his portfolio. A "decree" making these changes possible would later be submitted for presidential approval. This formality would be completed in a few days and the structure sought by Ozal for the new council of ministers would be obtained before the date which the government would seek a vote of confidence.

This is not the only help that Ozal has received. As his team of experts worked on the government's program, they were able to obtain information from any government organization or agency. All general directors within the Finance Ministry provided any information requested by Ozal's team. What is more amazing is that they did this with authorization from Finance Minister Kafaoglu. In addition, Ozal's team was able to obtain any information it wanted from the Office of the Prime Minister.

The President wanted the government that would lead the country following the general elections to be unable to claim that it had not been fully briefed before taking office. For example, during a high level meeting to discuss the situation of the K-C Group it was being requested that the head of the prospective government also see the decree being prepared in connection with this matter. Indeed, Ozal has been able to conduct his efforts towards the establishment of a government in an atmosphere of unprecedented cooperation. It can be said that no Prime Minister until this time has been shown this much understanding. Would it be wrong to say that this atmosphere is one that is particular to this period of transition or that it has been brought about by the renewal of democracy?

On Monday, Ozal will be presenting his cabinet list to the President for approval. It is likely that during the middle of the week he will be able to form a government with the kind of structure that he has been promising.

Nevertheless, the government and its structure constitutes only one of the topics on the agenda. In fact, there are many other topics that are worthy of attention. The matter of regional elections is one that is being addressed behind a veil of secrecy. Every now and then the importance of the matter can be assessed by looking at the type of answers that insistent newsmen are getting from party officials. The question of whether parties that could not take part in the general elections should participate in regional elections constitutes a problem for the ruling party as well as the main opposition parties. High ranking officials from the party in power are stating that regional elections should be held as soon as possible so that regional governments can be placed under civilian control. They are indicating that such elections should be held in May or June.

While such an attitude may seem to be innocuous on the surface, certain important aspects must be considered. In order to participate in local elections, parties that have not taken part in

general elections must be parties established at least six months before the elections. It is also required that such parties hold general conventions before the election. It is likely that the currently existing parties will soon hold conventions and complete their preparations as soon as possible. It is also highly likely that the participation of new parties in regional elections will bring changes to the parliamentary arithmetic that emerged from the general elections of 6 November.

The main opposition party is also in favor of not allowing the participation of new parties in regional elections. Openly or by implication, officials from the Populist Party are arguing that the parties which will take part in the first regional elections should be the ones that took part in the first general elections. The Correct Way Party and the Social Democratic Party are aware of the Populist Party's inclinations and are concerned that the party in power will take a similar stance. In taking precautions against such an eventuality, the Correct Way Party has announced that it will be holding its convention in February while the Social Democratic Party has let it be known that its convention will be held in late February or early March. The internal activities that have taken place in connection with these parties over the past two days are geared towards the objective of taking part in regional elections. It is clear from this very moment that the regional elections will constitute an upheaval within the Turkish political scene.

The Nationalist Democratic Party's orientation towards regional elections is not similar to the stance taken by the Motherland Party and the Populist Party. The Nationalist Democratic Party's outlook towards the matter may be summarized as one of ambivalence towards which parties will compete in regional elections. For an explanation of this attitude we might wish to remember the words "none of the votes we have received have been borrowed from other parties." Indeed, those were the words of Nationalist Democratic Party Chairman General Cevdet Sunalp in the aftermath of the general elections.

9491
CSO: 3554/95

PROFESSOR: FINLAND, SWEDEN SHOULD JOINTLY FIGHT CRUISE MISSILES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Dec 83 p 26

[Article by Henrik Sonck of the TT news agency: "University Professor Proposes Finnish-Swedish Missile Cooperation"]

[Text] Finland and Sweden should be able to enter into some sort of cooperation for the exchange of radar information about the overflight of cruise missiles.

The missiles which Sweden does not "have time to" shoot down, should instead be picked off by the Finnish defense forces, reasons a Finnish academician in a recent contribution to the defense-political debate.

"In the future it might even function in the other direction," writes Prof Krister Stahlberg in the most recent issue of the Finno-Swedish intellectual debate magazine FINSK TIDSKRIFT.

Provocative

Stahlberg admits that it is a provocative suggestion and that "an extension of our defense in this manner is a heretical idea not least from the viewpoint of Swedish security."

"But one might ask whether there are not arguments in favor of testing that idea. It does, after all, involve the threshold concept which is common to both countries."

The probability of being shot down should be felt to be so great that it is not worth it to sacrifice expensive missiles, so that the missiles will instead be programmed for a different course than the one passing over our countries.

The deeper the defense zone, the greater the probability that a missile will be shot down, Stahlberg writes.

Shortsighted

In the magazine Stahlberg, professor of public administration at Abo Academy (the Swedish-speaking university), presents a critical interpretation of Finland's security policy.

"In an altered military-political situation, reacting solely through foreign-political adjustment might turn out to be shortsighted. A deviation from the country's fundamentalist neutrality policy could directly damage our interests. Defense-political arguments concerning the foreign policy must therefore be considered. They presume armament," in Stahlberg's opinion.

Soviet Union

Stahlberg believes that a joint surveillance arrangement with Sweden could be a means to realize the obligations which are imposed by Finland's friendship and assistance pact with the Soviet Union.

11949

CSO: 3650/73

ARMY INSPECTOR ON PERSONNEL PROBLEMS, WEAPONS PLANNING

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 83 pp 14-21

[Interview with Lt Gen Meinhard Glanz, army chief of staff; date and place unspecified: "The Peace Debate Has Helped Consolidate the Army"]

[Text] This is the fifth time since 1979 that WEHRTECHNIK has conducted year-end interviews in its December issue with the chiefs of staff of the army, the air force and the navy. Our first interviewees were Lt Gen Hans Poeppel, Lt Gen Friedrich Obleser and Vice Admiral Guenter Luther. In this issue, we are interviewing Meinhard Glanz, Eberhard Eimler and Ansgar Bethge, the first 'self-made' chief of staff.

5 years passing in review give an indication of what has changed in the armed forces although a number of problems have remained the same. For a wide variety of reasons, some decisions could not be taken—for one thing for lack of funds. Some programs had to be postponed so that the same questions had to be asked again in succeeding years. And so, in this year's interviews, which were conducted in early November, we are once again talking about personnel problems, learning experiences with new weapons systems, future planning, etc, etc.

In this particular year-end interview with the army chief of staff, Lt Gen Meinhard Glanz talks about army personnel problems as well as about equipment plans for the next several years. He points out that there has happily been some improvement in the personnel sector over the past few months and that "Marder" commanders will henceforth hold the rank of sergeant. Also, the shortage of non-commissioned officers is no longer as serious as it was. Ways are being considered to reduce usage backup, one of the most serious problems the army faces; but, Glanz says, no political decisions have as yet been reached on this issue. Lt Gen Glanz also is pleased with the way the men under his command have dealt with the peace issue. It helped consolidate the army by forcing them

to face up to their mission and how to fulfill it and draw the necessary consequences. On equipment, Glanz feels that battle tanks will continue to be important and that their number will therefore not be reduced. He also says that development of an armored personnel carrier will begin this year and that reconnaissance must be improved although not all of his wishes in this regard can be fulfilled because of budget cuts.

[Question] Only 1 or 2 years ago, assignment and promotion problems along with other Bundeswehr personnel worries were a matter of vital public interest. Now things have quieted down. Is that a deceptive kind of quiet or has there been some real improvement lately ?

[Answer] Let me talk about the improvements first. The German army is a large organization numbering about one-third of a million soldiers. Just considering such a large number of men, there would have to be some sectors where improvements need to be made. As an example, let me tell you about two or three improvements. Some of our military vehicle driving instructors used to be at a disadvantage; this year, we managed to do something about that. Until now, half of these driving instructors were unable to get any rank while the other half held the rank of technical sergeant. Now, every one of them has a chance of making sergeant. Also, we are just about to open the way for the "Marder" commanders and squad leaders to become full sergeants...

[Question] Which is something you have been wanting to do for some time...

[Answer] But for the time being we will be able to promote both groups only on the basis of authorized positions. We are also on the verge of reorganizing the technical specialist category by improving on the ratio between 2d lieutenant/1st lieutenant and the captain positions. We will be making some decisions very soon but it will take some time to carry them out.

Now let me get to the personnel usage problem, which is one of our biggest worries. We all know what the reason for it is. Because of the age structure we have in the army, we do not see an appreciable number of our people retiring over the next 10 years. From the personnel point of view, therefore, the army will be pretty rigid—one might even say it will become petrified. For this reason, we are urgently looking for a solution. A large number of proposals have been placed on the table and will be submitted to the minister soon. I hope that some of them will be adopted as soon as possible in spite of the fact that they will no doubt cost a lot of money.

[Question] More and more conscripts—and volunteers, too—who perform their military service in the army are faced with increasing difficulties when they start looking for a job or try to enrol in a university after discharge. Despite the fact that the defense ministry is taking some remedial steps, the number of soldiers having trouble with their education is likely

to climb substantially in 1984. What more can the army do to alleviate these problems which have an adverse effect on the psychological climate among the troops ?

[Answer] You are bringing up a problem which began to emerge 2 years ago and which by now really has us worried. It is not so much a problem that can be solved by the armed forces or even the Bundeswehr as a whole or the defense ministry as such but rather something that the cabinet has to decide. The defense minister has taken the matter up personally; he is well aware of the seriousness of the problem.

The army itself cannot do very much; we are dependent on the overall steps that are taken. What we really want is to do a better job of informing the draftees of the educational opportunities available to them inside the military establishment. We are always telling our commanders to sit down and talk to representatives of management and labor—both locally and regionally—and to provide all the information they can get their hands on.

[Question] There is probably no way of getting around the problem of the low birth rate age groups which the Bundeswehr will be facing during the next few years. If a solution is found, it will be primarily a political one. Nonetheless, our readers are sure to be interested in what your own personal opinion is on the following issues: women serving in the army; personnel cuts—but where ? letting civilians do some military jobs; higher pay in order to attract more volunteers ?

[Answer] We are still working on specific proposals at this time; they have not yet been submitted to the minister. That is why I am glad that you asked for my personal opinion—and that is how I would like to see my answers interpreted, too.

Sooner or later, we will have to open the armed forces up for women volunteers. During the past year, the Italian and Yugoslav armed forces did so. Ours are among the last armed forces which have not yet done so. I could see women serving in special units and/or organizations which are commanded by women. There is a large number of ways in which they could be used.

[Question] But doesn't that also imply that there would have to be a table of organization for women and that we might have a woman general 20 or more years hence ?

[Answer] I hope I get to be old enough to get to shake a German woman general's hand at some reception some day.

Let me turn to your question regarding personnel cuts now. If we have to cut, it can only be done at the expense of some of our assigned duties. Further thinning out—or at least a significant amount of it—would jeopardize our mission.

Now as far as turning some duties presently performed by soldiers to civilians is concerned, I would say why not ? I could see several possibilities of doing that. Of course there are limits—particularly in terms of the debate concerning the 35-hour week. Among us soldiers, an up to 56-hour work week is considered normal—with no overtime pay.

[Question] Could you give us some examples of how civilians might be used ?

[Answer] I would rather not. For one thing, we are still in the deliberating stage and I would only be making the men in the units that might be affected uneasy. It is a matter of comradeship and fairness not to discuss untested planning considerations in public.

The last thing you asked about was whether we might increase the number of volunteers. That is something we should look into. For example, I could see us re-introducing a bonus for signing up and other successful gambits that were used in the past. But as for having foreign nationals serve in our armed forces, we are no longer considering that option.

All this is my personal opinion—and let me repeat, we have not reached the decision-making stage on any of this.

[Question] The peace movement has insisted on demonstrating in front of military installations. To what an extent were your men prepared for the peace demonstrators—both in terms of using force and in terms of being provided with the necessary arguments ? For instance, were the soldiers informed about the NATO flexible response with the nuclear deterrent ? Was there an open debate within the units and were the non-commissioned officers and the officers prepared for such debates ?

[Answer] Let me address the question regarding the use of force first which always seems to arouse the most interest. We did not have to make any special preparations or take special steps because this matter has been regulated for some years by the law on the use of direct duress by the Bundeswehr. This covers all eventualities—even those which did not occur but might have.

Now on providing the necessary arguments, that is the specific job of the local command personnel as well as of other ranking officers inspecting units under their commands—which, incidentally, includes the chief of staff. In most instances, this is taken care of locally in a satisfactory manner. In some instances it is not and in those we offer some help. But we do not issue anything like official ministry guidelines. In this instance as in any other, the mission-type order applies as our guiding principle for mission accomplishment. To all the men at all ranks we describe their particular mission; we provide them with additional explanatory material. But we leave it to them—there are some who even say we force them—to work the material out themselves and then to pass it on. The only special help we provided—in addition to a lot of written materials—were Bundeswehr-wide seminars. The troops were grateful for these and they were a big success.

[Question] In other words, there was no extra political education or anything like that ?

[Answer] That is also up to the local commanders; there were no orders from above. But I am glad to say that increased use is being made of the method of providing topical information. For example, at the morning call, the company commander will take a few minutes to comment on some important topical event or technical duties are cut by 5 minutes for that purpose.

Of course the peace debate has had an impact on us. But to my great satisfaction I have found that the discussions and activities throughout the year have had a way of consolidating the army. The leaders and the led were forced to come up with a clearer picture of the mission, the accomplishment of that mission and the consequences resulting from it. We did not run into any special problems with our draftees—as one might have expected.

[Question] The armed forces have placed much stock in increased use of electronic equipment because this might help save manpower in some sectors. Now you are in the midst of introducing such electronic systems—both weapons and control systems. Have your expectations been fulfilled ? Have you been able to save manpower ? Or have you run into the problem of not being able to find enough trained operators and maintenance personnel ?

[Answer] About 10 years ago, I was assigned to a command function for the first time where data processing and electronic equipment was used. Even then I said that data processing and electronic equipment would not save manpower. Now, 10 years later, I see no reason to change my mind. Better use is made of time; personnel are not taxed as much; the decision-making processes are more reliable and much faster—all that represents a big gain in command capability as well as combat effectiveness. But we have to come up with the operators and the maintenance personnel from our own manpower pool and the training costs are much higher. But that does not seriously worry me: the electronics maintenance companies in the maintenance battalions have been doing a good job.

[Question] You created an advisory group on army equipment this year. As far as I remember, this group has met twice thus far. Are you satisfied with the work it has done and will you set up similar advisory groups on other problems as well ?

[Answer] I am very much satisfied with the work the group has done. It shows that there was a need for a group such as this. There is still another group somewhat like it—the army commanders' group consisting of the commanding generals of the army corps; the commanders of the territorial commands; the chief of the General Army Office and the heads of the army operations staff. That is sufficient. That army commanders' group is an outgrowth of the hierarchical structure of the army; the advisory group on equipment is necessary because it represents a way of bringing together disparate organizational elements. All the other sectors of the army are so clearly defined that the existing hierarchical structure can do the job perfectly well.

[Question] In July, you introduced a group of parliamentarians to the medium artillery missile system "Mars" in the United States. Members of parliament made frequent visits to the army and you made a point of inviting members of the defense and budget committees for briefings on the mission of the army. Was that part of a public relations campaign you were starting on behalf of the army? Or were you simply trying to give our parliamentarians who are responsible for your budget a better idea of what the army does and what problems it has?

[Answer] We would not dream of taking advantage of members of parliament for army public relations purposes. But we do consider it our duty to provide the members of parliament with the basic information they need to make their decisions. They can only reach decisions, if they are well informed--and I mean decisions that stand up. In this sense, I consider what we did part of a self-evident duty to inform--not a public relations campaign. As a matter of fact, we will continue operating in this fashion. The fact that this helps contribute to a better understanding of the army, its mission and its problems--I consider that to be a bonus that I am very happy to get.

[Question] Lately, a great variety of anti-tank weapons has been developed: high-performance nuclear shells; projectiles which impact on tanks from above; self-contained locator submunitions for artillery missiles, etc. Does this warrant the conclusion that battle tanks will be subject to greater danger in the future; that their mission over the next 10 or 20 years will decline in combined arms combat and that the number of battle tanks in the German army might possibly be reduced?

[Answer] Modern weapons technology works to the advantage of the defending forces and lends more weight to firepower than heretofore although this, of course, has an impact on structures, equipment and operational procedures. But let me go back to what I said about the battle tank in last year's WEHRTECHNIK interview. I see no reason to change a single word of what I said even if the battle tank is subject to greater danger. As a defending army, there are countermeasures available to us. The tank's mission in combined arms combat will not be curtailed; it will in fact remain the same. We will therefore not be reducing the number of battle tanks in the German army. They will continue to be a part of the overall defense system; they will be performing a function which we cannot do without for a long time to come.

[Question] How much of a role do the anti-tank weapons we mentioned in your plans for the "Leopard 3"?

[Answer] They are factored in as we go along. We have time to develop and prepare the "Leopard 3"--and we are taking it. We have no intention of pushing it and we know we can totally rely on our German manufacturing industry to come up with solutions and to carry out whatever proposals are approved.

[Question] The expectation was that development of the "Marder" successor generation would start officially early this year. What are the reasons for the delay and where does the program stand at present with regard to the plans for different types of vehicles ?

[Answer] The delays are due to changes in overall Bundeswehr plans. We held back a little in order to see more clearly and we now expect that we will be able to come up with the necessary decision-making parameters by the end of this year. Chances are that we will look at the numbers of armored combat vehicles--excepting tanks--one more time. We will certainly be looking at the different types of vehicles one more time as well. It is conceivable that we will not be building a separate mortar combat vehicle during this particular planning phase. By the end of the year, as I said, the way should be clear to start on the infantry combat vehicle--the operational requirement of which will by then have been approved--and on the anti-tank vehicle--the so-called "Giraffe"--which may possibly be combined with the mission of attacking enemy helicopters. Even now we are training our men to attack hovering helicopters using anti-tank guided missiles of the "Milan," "Hot" and "Tow" type.

[Question] At one time, you described the improvement of reconnaissance as the focus of your efforts in the equipment field--giving preference to it even over night combat and command capability. In general terms, what do the army's reconnaissance plans look like for the future ?

[Answer] Let me give you a general schematic idea. In the brigades, the focus of reconnaissance lies on armored reconnaissance on the ground--combat reconnaissance by all units; the brigade reconnaissance platoon and the artillery observers. At the division level, the focus is on technological means of reconnaissance--the observer battalion of the artillery regiment, augmented by a tank reconnaissance battalion. At the corps level, the focus is on communications and electronic reconnaissance. Using control and information systems such as "Heros," data can be exchanged among the different command echelons more quickly--which means that not every reconnaissance tool must be available at every echelon. But this also makes it plain why we consider the control systems so important. We need to enhance our reconnaissance capability--in fact, we are well on our way toward that goal--particularly to benefit our long-range artillery. In this connection, let me mention the CL-289 drone and the KZO target locator mini-drone. We will not be able to do everything we would like to do. In selecting our reconnaissance tools, we will have to be guided by the budget much as I regret it--but I have to accept it.

[Question] The impression I get is that the various ground forces in the alliance are all adhering to their own reconnaissance concepts--indeed that they are frequently "doing their own thing" in this regard. Are there in fact any NATO guidelines on interoperability and future planning ?

[Answer] There have been for some time and I am happy to say that they have for several years now been leading to positive results and firmly fixed procedures. Of course every nation has its own reconnaissance concept as well as its own reconnaissance tools. Our goal is to exchange the results of our reconnaissance operations; to make them available to each other. Thus, it is not so much a matter of equipment but rather of procedures or control systems and telecommunications. In every NATO maneuver and on the national level, too, these procedures are tested. The results, I would say, have been satisfactory. I expect that we will come up with results that are a bit better than that before the end of this decade.

[Question] The present and future state of German artillery was a topic of discussion at a symposium of the German Society for Arms Technology in October. It was said there that the American armed forces use 300 rounds per barrel each year for training purposes—while we only use 45. But 2 years ago, our figure was still up at 90 rounds. Can we still meet the training requirements at these levels? Or are we more advanced in employing simulated procedures than the Americans?

[Answer] You have just hit another sore spot in the heart of the army chief of staff. Based on rounds per barrel, our training ammunition ratio is too low. Like all military men in our army, I wish it were much higher. But for budget reasons we cannot increase it during the next few years. Since our spotters have had excellent training on simulators and small-caliber equipment, we can achieve target accuracy; but what we do not have enough of is training of the crews on the artillery pieces themselves and higher density target practice. Under the circumstances, our commanders get a very limited impression of what artillery fire support under actual combat conditions might be like. Nonetheless—we will have to make do with 45 rounds. In fact, it is sufficient for training purposes; but we cannot go beyond that.

[Question] What about the supply of ammunition generally? Are you satisfied with it?

[Answer] Except for the artillery, we have enough ammunition for training purposes in all other units. We had delays and shortages both last year and this year; but we have been able to overcome them in the meantime with the help of fresh supplies.

[Question] Will the "Leopard 2" be taking part in the next Canadian Army Trophy?

[Answer] At the 1985 Canadian Army Trophy, the "Leopard 2" will be doing its stuff. I made that decision just 5 days ago.

[Question] At these year-end interviews in your office one always realizes how quickly a year goes by. If I should now ask you what was important this past year; what are your plans for the future—what would you highlight for our readers?

[Answer] In looking back as well as ahead, I might tell you that we had 129,000 reservists participating in army exercises this year which lasted an average of 6 days. Now that amounts to more than one-third of the army's peacetime strength and if you ask me, it is putting the reservist potential to very good use. In 1984, we will be reaching the same numbers once more.

And I can cite some very respectable figures on equipment as well. We placed more than 500 new or rebuilt tracked vehicles into service--mostly "Leopard 2's" but also "Rolands," "Jaguars," armored reconnaissance vehicles and so forth in addition to more than 3,500 wheeled vehicles. In 1984, we expect there will be about 500 more tracked vehicles and some 4,000 wheeled vehicles--and these are figures none of the other NATO partners has ever attained.

I am also very pleased by the fact that we managed to cut the non-commissioned officer shortage almost in half this year. In statistical terms, we have one enlisted man in training for every prospective non-com position. This has come about because we have more and better personnel applying for these positions and because we have been doing a targeted job of publicity and selection among the troops. In the main, we are dealing with men who have signed up for 4 years or more. Short-service volunteers who have signed up for just 2 years are in the minority. These successes are not merely due to the overall economic situation; the attractiveness of serving in the army has something to do with it, too.

From our point of view what counts is that we are thereby creating the cadre density we have been aiming for for decades. Training is being improved and we are definitely cutting down on service inadequacies. We can tell that this is happening because the complaints are getting fewer all the time.

Let me say just one final word about the maneuvers. In that area, we had been looking for new approaches --getting away from corps-wide maneuvers and making them army-wide and including the territorial army and the air force; conducting post-fire assessment not on an umpire-versus-umpire basis but on the basis of the effect it has on higher staff operational plans; conducting assessment of air defense, air attack and post-strike impact on the operational level. This year's exercise has shown that we have made that a reality. I am particularly pleased about the fact that it has taken only 3 years for this new-style army maneuver to be accepted as standard procedure by one and all.

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NAVY INSPECTOR ON SHIP PROCUREMENT, MERCHANT MARINE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 83 pp 34-39

[Interview with Vice Admiral Ansgar Bethge, navy chief of staff; date and place unspecified: "Well-Balanced Resources to Fulfill Baltic, North Sea and Adjoining Waters Mission"]

[Text] In the navy, too, there has been improvement this year in the personnel sector--particularly among long-term personnel. Vice Admiral Ansgar Bethge, the navy chief of staff, also told WEHRTECHNIK that new weapons systems are being designed in such a way that they place fewer demands and call for fewer operators. In part, this can be achieved by means of standardization at the component level. Bethge expresses concern, however, about the decline in German merchant marine tonnage. The vice admiral also says that the basic approaches to fire protection on German warships in the aftermath of the Falklands experience are correct. Other topics discussed include the role of the German submarine fleet as well as plans to modernize it; the use of the "Seaking" for possible armed reconnaissance missions; defense against mini-sub and training assistance for foreign navies--which Bethge also looks at from the point of view of providing help to the German shipbuilding industry which is faced with problems of its own at this time.

[Question] Due possibly to poor economic conditions overall, the Bundeswehr personnel picture has recently been improving somewhat. But in the long term, the Bundeswehr will probably run into serious problems. What is the navy doing about the prospective lack of manpower in the late eighties and early nineties and how does that affect its equipment programs?

[Answer] Last year and this we had a lot of applicants and our personnel budget has been increased over 1982. As a result, the trend among long-term navy personnel this year has been particularly satisfactory. Using all of our allocated funds, we should attain a 4.5 percent rise in this group--which is equal to 1,200 men.

According to current forecasts, the personnel situation should stabilize further over the next 2 or 3 years. Beyond that, however, the decline in young men of military age in the late eighties will have a negative impact. Countrywide steps will have to be taken to deal with this development. A number of considerations along these lines are presently being weighed.

Independent of any such measures, the navy will have to cope with this anticipated development on its own. We are doing so for example by designing our new weapons systems in such a manner that they place fewer demands on the operators and take fewer men to operate. We will also have to introduce greater standardization with other weapons systems and within our own weapons and equipment arsenal—including software—because that would be one particular way of saving on training personnel.

[Question] Could you give us an example of a personnel-saving measure ?

[Answer] One example would be the frigate 122. The crew of a destroyer numbers 337 men; but the frigate 122 crew numbers only 200. Our frigates and PT-boats use the same motors; they have the same electrical motors, the same airconditioning systems and radio equipment; the same 76-mm guns, the same ECM equipment and so forth. We have a lot of compatible equipment already.

[Question] The Soviet merchant marine is being built up according to plan. It has been offering lower freight rates and thus has been obtaining an increasingly large share of the freight volume involved in trade even among Western and Third World nations. The result is that Western merchant marines are shrinking in size—including the German merchant marine. Does this trend worry you—because in case of war we would certainly depend a great deal on our merchant marine as a support element ?

[Answer] Economic and structural problems are resulting in a loss of tonnage for our merchant marine—and so are adulterated competition by state-run economies and control over cargo shipment on the part of some Third World countries. The navy is concerned about this from a security policy point of view because it has an adverse impact on the national as well as NATO-wide transport and supply function of the merchant marine as part of the overall deterrent. It also has a negative impact on the maintenance of sufficient supplies to help withstand lengthy crisis situations and on the short-term mission of bringing up reinforcements as a means of coping with crisis situations. Given our present situation, only one-third of the FRG's oil supplies and only about one-fifth of our dry goods needs could be handled by the German merchant marine. Our purely military needs at this time, however, could be met by our merchant marine—although with some difficulty.

[Question] A large number of German merchant ships are flying "low cost" flags. How many of these ships would be available to us in case of an emergency ? Could we call them a kind of reserve fleet ?

[Answer] About 4 million tons—which comes to almost 40 percent of overall German merchant tonnage—are flying foreign flags. According to existing law, these ships could not be used for seaworthy foreign trade purposes—unless they happened to be located in German territorial waters. Whether or not these ships would constitute a reserve and could be used in case of a crisis or war situation would depend on the German shipowners. Would they fly the German flag again? We assume that the appropriate authorities are giving some thought to this matter. The way the Americans are handling this problem gives us an indication of how one might go about it.

[Question] In the United States and Great Britain consideration is being given to the possibility of equipping merchant ships with antiaircraft weapons, if the need arose or to install starting and landing pads for helicopters and vertical takeoff aircraft on them. Does our navy have similar plans?

[Answer] None as yet. In view of the rising cost of warship procurement on the one hand and the increasing threat by the other side on the other, we will surely have to come up with some ideas on how to turn the appropriate merchant ships into auxiliary vessels for various purposes in cases of emergency by the use of containers or other types of equipment.

[Question] By now, you have probably come up with some firm assessments on the Falklands conflict. What conclusions have you drawn from it in terms of plans for future weapons systems? For instance, is there a need for rethinking the navy's fire protection procedures?

[Answer] My primary goal—even prior to the Falklands conflict—was to improve antiaircraft weaponry to protect against aircraft and missiles. We are making a major effort to achieve that goal by equipping our ships with improved sensors and effectors. The Falklands events have proven that we are headed in the right direction.

Against the backdrop of the Falklands conflict we conducted a study on the danger to our ships and boats from fire resulting from bomb and missile strikes.

The results of this study pointed to the urgent need to improve fire protection through the introduction of physical, manpower and organizational measures; through the planning and construction of future ships on the basis of the data obtained and through adapting damage control plans and damage control training to the new data.

Taking the budget situation into consideration, we have come up with a feasible program aimed at carrying out these improvements. It includes short-term measures such as the improvement of hand-held fire extinguishing equipment; issuing protective gear to personnel and stepping up fire control training.

Medium-term measures such as equipping our vessels with heavy but portable extinguishers to be used in case of sprinkler system failure; improvement of breathing protection equipment and --this not being unimportant--replacing aluminum components wherever possible and a number of other minor measures.

The basic thinking behind our fire protection plan was correct and it still is; but we must make some improvements here and there. We should not forget that the German navy has a long tradition of effective damage control. It is well known that our ships--even in World War I and again in World War II--had a longer service life than those of our then enemies.

[Question] The German navy extends training assistance to a number of other fleets--particularly in conjunction with exports by the German shipbuilding industry. Can this be effectively done with existing training personnel or would you need additional positions ?

[Answer] As far as training assistance for other NATO countries is concerned, the German navy can do its job with the personnel on hand. Training assistance in conjunction with arms exports, on the other hand, is provided only to a limited extent, since this type of assistance does indeed place a burden on the units involved.

We will see what demands are placed on us. Organizational measures alone will not suffice to meet any additional demand. Under those circumstances, we would have to ask for additional positions.

I might mention that we are of course happy to extend this type of training assistance, since we know it helps out our German shipbuilding industry in its time of trouble.

[Question] On 1 November, the navy turned over the first "Tornado" squadron to NATO--which is something to cheer about. Nonetheless, it is known that there are still some problems. What is your view of these difficulties and/or is any thought being given to assuming logistic responsibility for navy aircraft ?

[Answer] The navy's organizational structure has purposely been designed in such a way that it does not assume logistic responsibility for specific aircraft. But for years now, some navy personnel have been assigned to the air force both for logistic and training purposes. In this way we make sure that things are handled along the same lines in the navy, too.

The "Tornado" weapons system problems you have mentioned are the kind of initial difficulties which invariably arise when a new weapons system is first introduced. Above and beyond that, there are some problems which we were aware of and which we consciously accepted--such as the scant supply of spare and replacement parts. As long as we have to deal with opera-

tional modifications during the introductory period on the one hand and on the other hand will continue to produce the system for years to come, it would be uneconomical to lay in large stocks.

The use of the extensive ground equipment and the complicated test procedures in maintenance call for training and experience which we must still acquire. Also, we should not forget that we are dealing here with a tri-national weapons system from a logistic point of view and that there are a great many peculiarities with which we will have to familiarize ourselves as yet.

[Question] In its reply to a parliamentary query, the government stated the navy will have to "forgo for the time being" procurement of a seventh and eighth frigate for budget reasons. But it is now said that the navy, the defense ministry and even the cabinet have been talking about purchasing these frigates after all—with certain funds being diverted from other projects. Do you think that these efforts have a chance? Or are you more interested in submarines to be used west of Norway?

[Answer] We do not assign priority to submarines vis-a-vis ships in principle. The navy's procurement plans are aimed at providing well-balanced resources to fulfill our overall mission in the Baltic, the North Sea and the adjoining waters. What we have to take into consideration are our limited budgetary resources; the development of the threat; the NATO defense concept; the age and equipment of our units as well as the bigger picture which includes international agreements on cooperation in arms production. After weighing all of these factors—particularly the budget aspect—we reached the conclusion that the seventh and eighth frigate cannot be purchased during the eighties; that starting in the nineties, we will first have to modernize our submarine fleet and that we must wait until the mid-nineties about replacing our obsolete fighting ships of the "Cologne" and "Hamburg" class. This does not alter the fact that there already is a need today to replace the obsolete ships with additional new frigates. I think it is unrealistic to expect additional budgetary resources to be diverted from other projects for this purpose.

[Question] The navy has plans to modernize its 22 "Sea King" helicopter gunships equipped with missiles and to purchase additional "Sea Lynx" helicopters for use on the frigates. There are plans to introduce a new navy helicopter in the nineties—at first presumably on the frigate 90. In other words, the helicopter component is being beefed up. Does this mean you are turning away from fast patrol boats toward helicopters and from frigates toward submarines—with an eye to protecting the western end of the northern flank?

[Answer] There are no plans, nor is it possible to turn from fast patrol boats to helicopters and from frigates to submarines. To fulfill our convoy and area security mission in the North Sea and the adjoining waters, we will continue for some time to rely on maintaining the strength of our fighting ships. To protect the approaches to the Baltic, we need a fast patrol boat component—in addition to other forces.

The threat on the northern flank posed by the growing naval strength of the Warsaw Pact forces calls for adjusting our defense capabilities to this situation. We are meeting this requirement by adding helicopters capable of providing an anti-submarine capability as well as surface target information to our ships and by providing support for our fast patrol boats by means of helicopter gunships.

In concrete terms, our helicopter plans call for initially providing our new frigates with a circulating reserve component of two "Sea Lynx" helicopters; for assigning a second—combat mission—role to the "Sea King" helicopters by the end of the eighties—primarily for over-the-horizon-targeting which is the transmission of target data to the fast patrol boats. That is their major job. Whether they will be equipped with missiles or not—that is a budget question. If we do so equip them, it will not be to use them in combat against other surface targets but only in order to attack targets of opportunity.

By the mid-nineties, we will be replacing both types of helicopters with a new standard version. As we modernize the submarine component, we will also be creating better operational possibilities in the North Sea and the adjoining waters.

[Question] The agreement with Norway on cooperation in the submarine sector has been concluded. The navy will be getting 12 Norwegian-designed base guidance and weapon delivery systems. What are your submarine plans like at this point? Will there only be six large-size "North Sea" subs of the 211 class? To what an extent will the 206's still be provided with combat capability and which submarines are to replace them some day?

[Answer] Present plans are to maintain the required performance levels of the submarine fleet both by maintaining combat capability of existing vessels and by building new conventional submarines.

To maintain the combat effectiveness of the 12 U-206's, we will aim for the procurement, installation and integration of new sonar and torpedo fire control systems. This will also make it possible for us to use the new dual-purpose torpedo to attack naval targets and submarines.

Other measures to be taken will focus on electronic warfare and navigation; on overcoming deficiencies in the operation centers; on improving living and working conditions and on much-needed modifications on board ship and in the training programs.

The modernization agreement is to be signed in 1985 which means that the remodeled submarines should be coming back to us between 1988 and 1991.

The acquisition of new submarines is to start with the 211 class subs. Plans are to place six submarines of this type in service by the early nineties. During that same time period, six 205 class subs are to be retired.

Our plans for the 211 class submarines are to use them primarily in the waters of the northern flank area outside the Baltic to combat submarines and surface ships.

We plan to initial the construction agreement by 1987 and to commission the first vessel by 1991.

By the mid-nineties, another six new conventional submarines are to be put in service--primarily for use in the Baltic. By that time, the six 206 class submarines--which will not have been remodeled--will have reached the end of their service life.

[Question] The Soviets have been using so-called mini subs along the Swedish coast. In your view, are these simply reconnaissance craft or might they also be used for combat missions, if the need arose? Do we have any means of adequately defending ourselves against such mini subs?

[Answer] Such "mini subs" have been used for civilian purposes and on rescue missions for some time. According to Swedish reports, such mini subs have violated Swedish territorial waters on several occasions. Given the capabilities of these U-boats, they could be used both for reconnaissance and for sabotage missions.

The German navy has a well-balanced arsenal of naval and air weapons systems which, among other things, are suited for defending against mini subs. In addition, the navy has taken steps to prevent the intrusion of such mini subs into waters to which special protection needs to be afforded.

[Question] We are always hearing of Soviet submarines in Swedish waters. Are you in a position to exclude the possibility that they are not also engaged in reconnaissance in German and Danish territorial waters?

[Answer] I cannot; but it is unlikely because of the shallower waters; because of the strong tidal currents in the North Sea; because of the relatively level sea bottom and because of better position finding conditions. This makes it difficult, if not impossible for a "mother sub" to approach the coastline without being detected and limits the potential of a mini sub to move about undetected. The Swedish coastal cliff areas are almost ideally suited for operations of this kind--the German as well as the Danish waters much less so.

Another problem the mini subs would face is that both the German navy and the Danish navy have more and better position finding equipment at their disposal and that they have gained experience in antisubmarine warfare in a great many maneuver situations.

AIR FORCE COMMANDER CITES MATERIEL, PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Tampere AAMULEHTI in Finnish 5 Nov 83 p 24

[Article by Pekka Parantainen: "The Air Force Is Affected by Resource Shortage"]

[Text] The Air Force is beginning to have difficulty in carrying out their duties with the present resources. Especially an efficient use of the radar stations would require more personnel than there is today.

As for the antiaircraft defense, the major problem is that there are no antitarget missiles at all. The need becomes more accentuated especially because of the fact that the antiaircraft issue of the main bases of the Air Force, among others that of Pirkkala's, cannot be handled by any other means in a crisis situation. The antiaircraft defense needs necessarily a radar-based control system too.

The most central needs of the Air Force and the antiaircraft defense were discussed Friday in the joint and traditional meeting of the commanders of the units in Tampere.

The commander of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Rauni Merio, who had called the meeting, reminded again that the restrictions made in the peace treaty of Paris in 1947 ought to be revised especially as for the staff.

"This subject can also be approached by asking whether the 13th article does not restrict the realization of the YYA Treaty [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance]. The YYA Treaty requires that the country will be defended by all possible means that are available. The restrictions mean that not all measures are available."

When the wing of Satakunta obtains a half squadron of Draken interceptor fighters, the number of equipment will, for the first time, amount near to 60 fighter planes which is the upper limit allowed by the peace treaty.

"When the peace treaty was signed, there was, for instance, no radar equipment. Now our duty is to control the entire air space day and night. We will bump into restrictions on the personnel side in the first place.

"If we started using all radar stations 24 hours a day, this would mean that the personnel would multiply.

"In some western countries the air forces need about 100 people per one aircraft, including the background organization. If the corresponding figure is 25 in our country, then we have to be particularly efficient in order to run the system at full speed.

"The situation has changed so much since 1947 that the treaty cannot but restrict the operations. We also have to recall that the YYA Treaty did not come until a year later. There is a clear conflict, in other words, the first treaty weakens the power of the second one."

Lieutenant General Merio makes another remark that who else could better talk about the difficulties than the operators of the equipment and the devices.

Antiaircraft Defense Under Development

The antitarget missiles, whose importance has been emphasized also by the third parliamentary defense committee, are the first items on the purchase list of the antiaircraft supervisor of the Staff Headquarters, Colonel Aimo Heinaro.

The Air Force has had missile equipment since 1978 when it obtained the antiaircraft missiles that can be launched from the shoulder. The capital and its surroundings got the It-79 missiles which are designed for the area-defense and can be launched as high as ten km from ground level, in 1979 as the name indicates.

As for the control issue, the solution is almost within reach. The prototype of the radar for the control system is already completed, and in a couple of years the efficient equipment will probably be put into use too. As soon as they obtain the antitarget missiles, perhaps at the end of the decade, the equipment situation will be satisfactory according to Colonel Heinaro.

12190

CSO: 3617/46

BORDER GUARD STUDYING PURCHASE OF PUMA COPTER; ANTISUB ROLE SEEN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Nov 83 p 11

[Article by Jyri Raivio: "The French Puma Proposed as the New Sea Copter for the Border Patrol: A Condition for the Purchase Is Also Its Capability for Antisub Role"]

[Text] Over the next few years Finland will order French copters which are either manufactured under license in Indonesia or purchased directly from the original manufacturer. The copters, which will be purchased for the Border Patrol, will be also used in searching for submarines and in antisub operations in addition to rescue operations on sea.

It is most probable that this will be approximately the result of the studies which are being conducted by a state committee as well as by the Defense Department and the Border Patrol.

However, all the people involved in this matter deny such far-reaching conclusions in a way which, in general, is typical of the state administration and especially of the defense administration, but as far as the present situation is concerned, it is very difficult to end up with any other result.

The only fact which the army leaders frankly admit and have already stated many times also in public is that Finland indeed needs copters suitable for submarine searching and antisub operations. This was stated by the Chief of Staff, General Jaakko Valtanen at the first press conference a few weeks ago, and this need is also confirmed by the Chief of Staff Headquarters, Vice-Admiral Jan Klenberg. According to Klenberg, the investigation of copters, especially for antisub role, is just taking its first steps. To a limited extent, the copters that are already in the country could be used for such tasks, but the result would not be good.

That is about all Klenberg says. The matters, such as the type, user, and equipment of the necessary copters, are just under preliminary discussions. However, it is not unreasonably hard to guess the outcome of the study.

Antisub Role to Border Patrol

To guard the borders, also at sea, is the Border Patrol's task which has been done for years by using copters too. The Border Patrol's copter activities have been heavily enforced ever since the rescue operations at sea were assigned more clearly than before to that department.

The antisub copter is also suitable for rescue operations at sea for which purpose a new base will be completed for the Border Patrol in Turku next fall.

The Border Patrol is more suitable than the actual defense forces to search for submarines also for the reason that the copters carrying civilian license plates of the department are allowed to land in Aland. Military planes have to stay away from the demilitarized Aland.

The entire flight operations of the Border Patrol are being investigated by a committee led by the former CEO of the Aviation Board, K.J. Temmes, which will release its report by the end of the year. According to the chairman, the main task of the committee is to investigate the controversial copter issue with regard to rescue operations at sea, but in the same context, it is "impossible to avoid" the antisub issue.

Another possible department to fend submarines with copters is the Air Force which also has lots of experience of helicopter operations on sea. The Air Force's copter equipment has, however, been concentrated in Utti, far from the most active operation areas, and to chase submarines is very far from the Air Force's main task which is to control and defend the air space. On the other hand, to train other defense branches, which in this case would mean the Navy, to use copters is an unrealistic alternative.

Indonesian Copters as Trade Exchange

The present 2-engine copter used in sea operations both by the Air Force and the Border Patrol is the Soviet Mi-8. Its suitability for rescue operations at sea has been under discussion for a long time, and the Temmes committee is expected to be the final judge in this matter.

However, the Mi-8 is not suitable for submarine search or antisubmarine operations in any case. The necessary submersible sounding devices (in professional language dipping sonar) and listening buoys (sonobuoy) are heavy pieces of equipment, and the loading capacity of the Mi-8 threatens to be insufficient for the additional equipment needed in the rescue operations alone. Furthermore, the use of search equipment requires so-called hovering automation which cannot be installed in the Mi-8.

To replace the Mi-8 submarine searchers would need a helicopter which would be equipped with two engines and hovering automation and which would be suitable for transportation. As for the special conditions in Finland, it should have deicing equipment also in the rotor blades. There are only two western manufacturers, the American Sikorsky and the French Aerospatiale, that manufacture such copters.

The latter is a stronger candidate for commercial political reasons, among other things. An especially strong candidate is the French helicopter manufactured under license in Indonesai. Valmet is offering a billion mark paper mill to Indonesia, and as a trade exchange the state-owned aircraft factory of Indonesia is offering French helicopters.

Finns are also interested in French equipment for submarine searching. According to Klenberg, the Navy is already investigating the equipment made by the French Thomson CSF and the CIT-Alcatel, among others.

12190

CSO: 3617/46

ARMED FORCES COMMANDER DEMANDS COMPENSATION FOR DEVALUATION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Erik Liden: "Armed Forces Commander on the Future: Defense Must Be Compensated"]

[Text] "The defense has gotten caught in an impossible situation. We cannot continue to live a hand-to-mouth existence, it is not rational and, above all, it is not in accordance with the parliamentary decision. Substantial financial compensation is now needed."

These serious words were said by Commander of the Armed Forces Lennart Ljung on Friday as he commented on the five-year plan submitted by him last Thursday to the government.

"I have never experienced such rapid and major economic changes for the Armed Forces as now," the Armed Forces commander said. "The consequences for our defensive strength are simply not acceptable. Even if the limitations of the defense decision taken by the government last spring are taken into account, we are still about 5 billion short for the 1982-87 five-year period."

"About 2.5 billion kronor are caused by the strong rise in the dollar exchange rate. The military leadership is in complete agreement about this, and we are supported by the various studies which have been made."

The new defense price index which was introduced in 1982 was a result of the lengthy and extensive studies based on the experience of the social economy of the 1970's. At that time Sweden had relatively stable exchange rates, which is why no one thought to include them in the index.

"I now demand a review of our system of compensation in order to achieve stable long-term planning. I am also worried about what the proposal to abolish the indexing may mean to the defense."

The Armed Forces commander emphasized that the defense is the only sector of society which has had reductions in its purchasing power during the last 10 years. No other public activity has been reduced. A comparison with the

development of defense expenditures in the rest of the Western world shows that Sweden is far down on the list.

If the defense does not receive compensation for the dollar, the Armed Forces commander will be forced to make heavy cuts in both the peacetime and wartime organizations. His greatest worry at this time is the fighter aircraft force and the way government authorities intend to deal with the Draken divisions. A decision must be made in 1984 concerning one of the three divisions threatened by disbanding.

The refresher training program will be almost completely cancelled in the Navy for 1984/85 and will be curtailed in the other branches of the Armed Forces. Materiel projects will be delayed or eliminated. Peacetime units must be disbanded, one air wing, KA 4 in Goteborg, will be minimized and in the Army the organization must be further limited.

"We know that disbanding units saves money," the Armed Forces chief says, "but as of today neither I nor the Army chief can point to what regiments are being considered. The military command and defense area organization will be reviewed and old studies will be brought up."

The Armed Forces commander does not want to discuss in concrete terms whether I 3 in Orebro, which was earlier indicated, is now being considered again.

The Armed Forces chief has submitted to the government a long list of examples of what can be regained if compensation for the dollar is granted. For 1984/85 the Armed Forces commander demands 20.4 billion kronor for military defense.

11949

CSO: 3650/76

CONSERVATIVE NEWSPAPER BACKS FORCES' CHIEF ON FUNDS NEED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Struggle for the Defense"]

[Text] Over the next 5 years there will be on the order of 5 billion Kronor too few in order to be able to accomplish the intentions of the defense decisions that have been taken. Without these five billion, our chances of defending the country will deteriorate.

Yesterday, when the chief of the Armed Forces presented his supplementary program plan, he established for the second time this fall--although he did not express it that way--that with its defense policy the government is seriously damaging our capability of defending the country.

The Armed Forces chief maintains that "the planning implies that the capability to deter war of the defense forces is weakened." The Armed Forces chief further says that the risk is increasing that we will be forced to fight a war far inside the country; our defense against invasion is being weakened at the expense of the civilian population.

As when he presented his actual program plan a few months ago, the statements of the Armed Forces chief are very harsh. But one has very quickly become accustomed to them. The fact that the country's supreme commander states that our ability to defend the country is seriously weakened no longer alarms anyone.

When penetrating behind the words, however, the content becomes frightening. In plain words, the chief of the Armed Forces is saying that there is an increasing risk that an invasion will succeed. A foreign force will then occupy at least portions of the country. The risk what we will have war here in Sweden is growing.

The Armed Forces chief thereby paints the horrifying picture which underlies the public opinion on peace both in this country and in the rest of Europe. By neglecting the defense policy, the risk increases that we here in Sweden will experience the same things that on television we see taking place in Beirut and Tripoli.

Based on the viewpoints of the public opinion on peace, the reaction to the warnings of the Armed Forces chief cannot very well be that we should disarm at a more rapid pace and to a greater extent. More than anything else we want to avoid precisely what follows disarmament, that is to say greater risk of invasion and being forced to wage defensive war in the interior of the country.

Despite peace engagements and despite the daily demonstration on television of the meaning of war, the warnings of the Armed Forces chief do not meet with any political reaction other than an informal working group of parliamentarians. The group is apparently supposed to legitimize the government's barely adequate compensation to the Armed Forces for the increase in the dollar exchange rate, one of the many conditions which led to the undermining of the resources of the defense forces.

Although it is extremely desirable to have unity on defense and security policy, this unity must not be won at the expense of the objective around which everything revolves: our capability of keeping the country out of war and war out of the country.

That is not achieved in closed chambers at the Defense Ministry. That is achieved by fighting for the defense forces.

11949

CSO: 3650/76

JAS PROJECT CHIEF ON EFFECT OF FUNDS SHORTAGE ON PRODUCTION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Erik Liden and Sune Olofson: "Dollar Exchange Rate Threatens JAS Armament"]

[Text] The industrial group producing the JAS [Fighter, Attack and Reconnaissance aircraft] is aided by about 15 foreign industrial companies. Deliveries which must be paid for in dollars. A total of 30-35 percent of the costs of the JAS/Gripen are dependent on the dollar. This has driven up the cost of the project by a few billion.

"It cannot be reasonable that the number of JAS/Gripen aircraft the Air Force will be able to buy during the 1990's should be determined by the dollar exchange rate."

"Today we have no political guarantees regarding compensation for a high dollar rate. That is governed by the interest and exchange rate policy in the United States, of course."

This is what technical director Sven-Olof Hokborg, JAS project chief at the Defense Materiel Agency, FMV, is saying now that the first project evaluation is about to be made and delivered to the government before July.

Today the JAS project is a few months behind, which has also had the result that the industry has not fully utilized the financial resources it was allotted. The industry is prepared to increase efforts to make up for these months.

Before the project evaluation Hokborg did not want to reveal all the details, but he states that so far the 30-billion project has been able to accomplish the technical objectives which were written into the contract of 30 June 1982. At that time Parliament had agreed to the JAS effort on 4 June that same year, a decision which last spring was confirmed by the Social Democratic government after a special JAS evaluation, which was approved by Parliament by a large majority.

Wing Problem

The delays which now hamper the project are due to various attempts at designing a main wing for JAS/Gripen, among others the so-called Rockwell wing, which has now been abandoned, and in some cases to delayed contracts with various subcontractors. About 15 foreign industrial companies are to deliver JAS parts to the JAS industrial group, IG JAS, which consists of Saab, Volvo Aircraft Engine, Ericsson and FFV [The Swedish National Industries Corporation]. These industries are responsible for the aircraft fuselage, engine, radar and target measurement equipment, countermeasures and maintenance equipment.

The cost picture for the project up to the year 2000 can be calculated quite precisely if certain preconditions are valid, for example a specific exchange rate development. When the JAS contract was prepared in 1981/82 the FMV, after hearings with the Armed Forces commander and the government, used a dollar rate of 4.58 in its calculations.

Everyone now knows that the rate is approaching 8 kronor, a 75-percent rise in a little over 2 years. Since 30-35 percent of the JAS/Gripen is dependent on the dollar, this has the effect that the aircraft project, calculated in today's dollar rate and with the same material content, is a few billion Kronor too expensive.

"If we do not receive compensation for the dollar or a drop in the rate, the material content of JAS must be affected in order to stay within the given financial framework," Hokborg says. It is difficult to change the basic aircraft, which will be unique because of its fighter-, attack- and reconnaissance tasks. IG JAS has a very advanced technical task in combining the three functions in one small aircraft.

Armament Delayed

"Other things such as armament will be delayed and will be difficult to carry out. It is a matter of months for certain projects and a few years for others, which causes several hundred million Kronor to be moved up in time. This means considerable and complicated replanning."

"Equipment for coordination and reconnaissance, countermeasures for various forms of electronic warfare and jamming of enemy missiles may also have to be reduced in quality and/or delayed. Basically, the expansion of the tactical control and base system is also considerably slower than we had anticipated earlier in our planning."

"The reasons for these changes are, among other things, that the economic preconditions for the defense and the Air Force changed radically after the 1982 defense decision. The dollar rate development is one reason."

'Modernize Draken'

"Since a very large part of the Air Force's money is tied down by the extensive contracts for Viggen and JAS, other objectives are hard pressed when the economy weakens. If this has the effect that the Draken divisions cannot be used until 1995, according to parliamentary decision, that is very unfortunate. We ought to learn from other countries and through modernization adapt older aircraft to today's and tomorrow's threat situation and better utilize the strong and reliable Draken construction."

Hokborg underlines that scrapping the Draken prematurely will both strongly impair the air defense and negatively affect the replacement potential for JAS. In the long run the industry must simply manufacture fewer new planes.

For the time being Hokborg and his approximately 100 colleagues in the FMV who are studying JAS full-time or part-time do not anticipate that the project will need to be interrupted in any way or that changes in the contract will become necessary.

"In the JAS we are planning for one of the world's most modern fighter aircraft systems and we have a great deal of qualification for this in Swedish and foreign industry which is being utilized. During the development period we must utilize the new technical advances which are being made in the areas of radar, electronics, engines and weapons, for example."

Countermeasures

"For example, we want to have the opportunity of later attaching FLIR (forward-looking infra-red) heat-seeking reconnaissance equipment in a capsule under the aircraft. We have also expended a great deal of effort to obtain effective countermeasures, which are completely necessary in the fighter environment of the 1990's."

"The air battles in the Middle East have taught us that without countermeasures the fight is lost. It is also important that countermeasures are protected by great secrecy, and Sweden is far ahead in the technical development with Ericsson, SATT [Swedish Company for Wireless Telegraphy] and SRA [Swedish National Map and Printing Organization?], among others.

The FMV is today discussing whether the 25 trainer aircraft which have been planned for training are needed or whether training can take place in simulators and other aircraft. The two-seater SK JAS will, if they are acquired, also be armed in order to be used in the wartime organization as well. Today, 25 SK JAS are included in the 140 JAS/Gripen which are part of the planning up to the end of the century. The government has indicated that cutting the 140 aircraft down to 130 is a possible way out if funds are not sufficient in the 1990's. A decision about the SK JAS must be made in 1985.

'Goals or Means'

"I have difficulty understanding how it can be reasonable for the dollar exchange rate to regulate the extent of the air defense, that is to say how many JAS/Gripen we will have by the year 2000," Hokborg says. "When goals and means no longer agree the politicians must be prepared to add new means or reevaluate the goals. Otherwise we will have no stability in long-range projects such as JAS with decisive defense-political and industrial importance."

Hokborg emphasizes that the FMV is nevertheless doing everything in order for the Armed Forces and the tax payers to get full value for the major effort which is undertaken with the JAS.

"I also believe that it is an unnecessary commitment to determine already today that we do not need a new Swedish fighter aircraft after 2010. Even if that were the case, it is not possible with conventional methods of analysis to determine this today. The responsible politicians must rethink this."

The evaluation of the project which is to be done every 18 months of the JAS project is part of the steering and control of the project which Parliament established in 1982. In a special proposal in March 1984 the government is to give an accounting of the current situation in the aircraft question, Sweden's largest national industrial project ever, today worth 30-35 billion kronor up to the end of the century.

The Defense Committee and the advisory board of the military leadership continually follow the JAS project. A special expert at the Ministry of Defense follows the project both at the level of the authorities and in industry.

Industrial Policy

The government is also following the industry policy measures which IG JAS has undertaken, among other things employment in Norrbotten and cooperation with major foreign companies.

The Committee on Air Materiel is watching over the possibilities for Swedish subcontractors to participate in the JAS project. Several orders have already been placed in Sweden instead of abroad, and more European companies have received purchase orders, reducing the dependence on the dollar by avoiding expensive purchases in the United States.

A special JAS council has been established in the Air Force and in the FMV a project leadership with high technical and financial competency.

In addition to the project evaluation, quarterly reports, encompassing among other things technical results, important changes, problems, cost situation, time schedules and feasibility, are submitted to the government.

The FMV is responsible for the totality of the orders to industry. The FMV is also to make an immediate report to the government and the Armed Forces chief if the JAS project does not develop in accordance with the intentions of the state authorities.

11949

CSO: 3650/76

VANDESTRICK ON WALLONIAN REGIONAL ECONOMY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 15 Dec 83 p 3

[Interview with Michel Vandestruck, president of the UWE, by P. Lo., date and place not given]

[Text] President of the Wallonian Union of Enterprises [UWE] for less than a week, Michel Vandestruck, chairman of the FN [National Federation] (Herstal) has also taken in hand the reins of the employers' federation, alongside Roger Davreux, managing director. The interview he granted our newspaper begins--quite naturally, we would say--with the question of whether the UWE, following the example of the VEV (Flemish Economic Federation) in Flanders, above and beyond its declarations of principle and most laudable objectives, is capable of getting Wallonian enterprises to follow its lead. And, consequently, of playing the role of "rallying point" for several key ideas.

[Answer] That would be the ideal situation. It is true that from this standpoint the VEV plays a more effective role than we do. You will note that it operates in an environment in which the partners voluntarily commit themselves to the same direction and express themselves within the framework of a consensus. Thus the VEV's actions have greater credibility.

Before we reach that point in Wallonia, we have to create the conditions for such a consensus whose absence forces us into a certain reserve in expression. What good does it do to brandish the banner of the UWE if, upon turning around, we find ourselves all alone?

I am not a pessimist. The conditions today are better than they were yesterday. Mr Dehousse's speech at our La Hulpe meeting, which was very cold and lucid, did not attempt to place the responsibility for the Wallonian decline on the shoulders of the employers. For a long time, the partners tried to put the blame on each other. That stage is past. Everyone in Wallonia is convinced of that, even if these things are not always said in public.

[Question] Although he denies it, Dehousse, the minister-president of the Wallonian executive committee, for some time has been extending his hand to the private sector, the merits and effectiveness of which he is rediscovering. What answer does the UWE have for him?

[Answer] Conditions must still be met before we are able to build together and dare to express ourselves in common. That said, Dehousse's opening seems quite interesting. Can we, however, answer this question: what does the austerity necessary for the development of the economy and recreation of wealth represent?

Austerity for austerity's sake? Certainly not. It is simply a matter of giving ourselves the means of acting.

[Question] Does your position paper "perspectives 1985" mean that you are giving yourself 2 years to achieve the desired consensus?

[Answer] We need not dream. In 1985, it will be necessary for a change to be perceptible vis-a-vis the situation of a year or two earlier. An evolution is taking place. The tone has never been as neutral as it is today. There are unmistakable signs. There is, for example, Wallonian dialogue which has existed for 10 months at the level of the Executive. That is a promising beginning.

[Question] Some have said that over the short term "Perspectives 1985" bears witness to your scepticism with regard to regionalization.

[Answer] The Wallonian Union is playing the game calmly, without mental reservations, in the existing institutions. The uncertainties imposed by regionalization cannot hamper our action. Why 1985 and not a longer term? For the same reason that the economic situation does not give us excess optimism. That is the least we can say. Let us be wary of announcing that everything will be better tomorrow.

[Question] The Wallonian Executive wants to show that he is more selective in the sector of aid to enterprises. Can he count on your support?

[Answer] The Wallonian Union is not a holding company. It does not have to make a decision about such and such investment. Its role is limited to the creation of the best conditions vis-a-vis this kind of operation. Of course, we intend to continue inducing a change in policy in this sector (less support for enterprises which do not have much of a future); however, we must not mix responsibilities.

[Question] You are limiting yourself, then, to a passive role. What happens in case of a setback?

[Answer] The UWE is not a guardian angel. It cannot prevent the holding companies (private and public) from acting. I repeat, our mission is to permit the spirit of enterprise to express itself. Not to contract.

[Question] Back of its showcase which you want to be as attractive as possible, the UWE is cruelly lacking in means. Do you intend to increase the federations possibilities for action?

[Answer] Over the short term, it is not a question of increasing the budget proper of the UWE by larger assessments. On the contrary, the Wallonian Union can and must cut back its actions by relying on the services existing at the regional and subregional levels. Another way of increasing our potentialities consists in our assuring ourselves of the active cooperation of persons employed in our enterprises.

[Question] The Wallonian Union is relatively poorly installed in the region. Can it get along with a federation in Liege and another in Charleroi?

[Answer] We are going to try to bring about a balance. Dialogue has to be stepped up with the other subregions of Wallonia. The chambers of commerce are the most valid spokesmen. But that is not enough. The Charleroi and Liege federations are operating, so to speak, without means. As I have said, it is all a question of cutting back...

[Question] The Wallonian Union often seems to suffer an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the VEV...

[Answer] I do not have that feeling even if the VEV is of concern to us and is harassing us. The inferiority complex would seem rather to be found in our chief spokesman.

[Question] Even so, is the UWE content to be second fiddle to the FEB [Federation of Belgian Enterprises]...

[Answer] We have our own identity. Here we have no inferiority complex. Each of us is an actor in his own sphere of action. Of course, we are careful to have the best possible cooperation with the FEB by trying, as we do in the core of our region, to use the services of the National Federation as much as possible.

[Question] After your brief stay in Cockerill-Sambre, here you are in the Wallonian Union. Spiteful persons are saying your duties at the FN leave you spare time...

[Answer] The question of my new presidency is not asked in terms of spare time or ambition. A certain quality of dialogue has to be instituted with the cooperation of the business leaders. If you feel that people expect this service of you, you cannot but answer: "Present!"

8143

CSO: 3619/20

UNEMPLOYMENT SHOWS DRAMATIC INCREASE OVER 1983

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Dec 83 p 32

[Text] Days of unemployment in November amounted to 26,000, meaning that around 1,200 persons were without employment throughout the month, approximately 1.1 percent of the country's work force, according to Social Welfare's spokesman Oskar Hallgrimsson yesterday. Unemployment was highest in the capital area, with 8,500 days of unemployment in November; the Northeastern District is second with 6,000, followed by the Western District with 3,300 days. The Southern District had 3,100 days of unemployment in November.

According to him, unemployment in November was markedly more severe than in October, which counted 15,000 days of unemployment within the country which translated to 576 persons being unemployed. Last year in November unemployment days numbered approximately 12,000, or 560 persons unemployed. According to Oskar, days of unemployment for this year now total approximately 260,000.

Oskar Hallgrimsson emphasized the difficulty of comparing this year's unemployment to last year's, particularly on account of the seamen's strike in January which greatly increased days of unemployment. However, comparing 10 months of 1982 to 10 months of 1983, February through November, we get 100,000 days of unemployment in 1982 to 200,000 in 1983, or a 100 percent increase, as last year unemployment affected 0.5 percent of the work force.

More exact figures on unemployment in November will be available today, Thursday.

9981

CSO: 3626/15

GALICIA 'XUNTA' OPPOSES REINDUSTRIALIZATION LAW

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 16 Dec 83 p 7

[Text] The Galician Xunta has decided to appeal on the unconstitutionality of the decree law of industrial reconversion. Although the reasons for the appeal have not yet been made public inasmuch as the decision was reached at a meeting held yesterday, the news was received with satisfaction in Galicia's labor circles in view of the fact that, as indicated by certain observers at the national level, this decision by the regional autonomous government could have an effect on the general political line pursued up to now by the parliamentary opposition on the subject of industrial reconversion.

A few months ago, during the first phase of the struggle waged by the workers of Vigo and its territory against the plans for industrial conversion, various members of the Galician Xunta expressed the uneasiness of the autonomous government in face of growing unemployment and the lack of an alternative policy of reindustrialization, a subject, however, on which the autonomous government is not competent to judge.

Nevertheless, until now, neither the AP [Popular Alliance], Popular Congress Group [GPC] nor the autonomous governments of the three regions in which the Popular Coalition (Galicia, Cantabria and Baleares) has obtained a majority have taken a definite stand with regard to the "Solchaga" plans for industrial reconversion. In this connection, almost the only statements made by the opposition are those recently made by Fraga Iribarne when the reconversion decree law was presented before Congress; this indicates a substantial change in the legislative scheme put forth by the minister of industry with regard to reconversion, since Mr Solchaga had stated repeatedly that reconversion would reach Parliament in the form of a bill.

Fraga Iribarne expressed his disagreement with the government for using the new decree law procedure which, in the opinion of the opposition leader, the socialists are abusing.

The decision of the Galician Xunta could now cause the GPC to reconsider its position with regard to the subject of industrial reconversion, coming up

with definite plans in defense of certain regions which are immediately going to suffer the consequences of the serious loss of jobs.

In this regard, the declarations of the minister of industry yesterday afternoon were quite explicit when he asserted that the committee pursuing the area of overall iron and steel production will meet on 20 and 21 December and that, "within the next few days the Sagunto blast furnace will be shut down and procedures will be followed in regularizing employment in the factory."

Mr Solchaga also stated that, barring last-minute problems, the royal decree law of industrial reconversion and reindustrialization will be ratified by Parliament at next week's session and that, immediately thereafter, the government will resolve by decree any questions relating to the conditions required by excess labor to comply with the Job Promotion Fund; he pointed out in this respect that there is very little possibility of agreement with the UGT [General Union of Workers] inasmuch as that socialist union organization is rejecting the rescission of contracts as a prerequisite for workers to have access to the Job Promotion Fund.

Yesterday afternoon the Sagunto employees held rallies preparatory to the general strike scheduled for 20 December at the port, in the city and throughout the territory, totally rejecting the government's plan to shut down the steel industry's blast furnace. Definite measures have been taken regarding the activities to be carried out; these will begin with a huge gathering in front of the autonomous government of Valencia to be followed in the afternoon by a march through various streets of the city.

8586

CSO: 3548/148

PSOE, UGT SEEK INDUSTRIAL POLICY ACCOMMODATION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 17 Dec 83 p 61

[Text] The Confederated Executive Board of the UGT [General Union of Workers] and the Federal Board of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], met yesterday at the headquarters of the Socialist Party to discuss the question of reindustrialization which, in UGT's opinion, is necessary but should be based on the condition that the contracts of those producers affected by the decree law to be ratified by Parliament within the next few weeks not be rescinded.

Jose Luis Corcuera, member of UGT's executive board, said that his union is predicating its support of the decree law on reconversion and reindustrialization on the condition that the contracts of the reconverted workers will not be rescinded.

At the meeting, UGT expressed agreement with the decree law of reindustrialization but conditioned its overall support of said decree law on the interpretation to be given to Article 22 which is to be finalized by the government in the form of a decree. The two executive boards decided that, at a subsequent meeting, UGT will be informed of the contents of the decree to be based on Article 22 of the decree law on reconversion and reindustrialization. The subsequent meeting will be held prior to discussion of the decree law by Parliament so that UGT and PSOE may agree on its contents.

At the conclusion of the first meeting, Manuel Chaves, member of the PSOE, asserted that there are differences of opinion, even basic ones, between the union and the party and that UGT therefore considered it advisable to hold a second meeting to discuss the subject from a political perspective and seek solutions.

"We discussed the various positions," he said, "and I believe that the socialist executive board reacted in a positive manner to the series of arguments brought up by UGT. In conclusion, there is no basic difference of opinion except for minor ones with regard to the contents of the decree law on reconversion, already published in the BOE [OFFICIAL STATE GAZETTE]. The main differences concern the interpretation of the decree with regard

to the application of Article 22 on industrial reconversion, especially with respect to the conditions of the Job Promotion Fund, to assimilate any surplus labor which may develop from industrial reconversion."

Chaves said that discussion of the decree will begin in Parliament, probably in the coming week of 26 December, inasmuch as it was agreed yesterday that the unions should have prior knowledge of the decree to be derived from Article 22 of the law and that, for this purpose, a new meeting should be held by the two executive boards. The socialist leader said that the previous meeting took place in an "absolutely frank" atmosphere.

UGT will fully condone the overall contents of the decree on reindustrialization and will, therefore, approve it, provided that the government does not consider the rescision of contracts a prerequisite to receiving reindustrialization funds. The socialist union believes it essential that restructured workers retain their contractual seniority, even when unemployed as a result of industrial restructuring.

Before the meeting, Nicolas Redondo, UGT's secretary general, was seriously thinking of warning the PSOE about UGT's possible refusal to accept reindustrialization. UGT also gave indications of uneasiness, not comparable to what occurred at the end of last summer, as a result of which UGT's directorate believes that this union is getting out of line on social-labor subjects.

8568

CSO: 3548/148

STATUTES, ANALYSIS OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION LAW

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 16 Dec 83 pp 20, 21

[Article by Higinio Paris Eguilaz]

[Text] Until now, the reflections we analysts had made on the effects of industrial reconversion pertained to the principles and probable method of application in Spain; but on 4 December 1983, the OFFICIAL STATE GAZETTE published the first decree law on reconversion. Therefore, we can now refer to the definite contents of that decree, and we believe it necessary to make a few general observations to obtain a better understanding of the decree in question.

According to the noted economist, Timbergen, it is of fundamental importance to know the difference between social justice and social efficiency inasmuch as the former is a static concept whose objective is to achieve a maximum equality of income by correcting any inequalities of individual income to a maximum degree; the latter is dynamic, and its aim is to promote the accelerated formation of capital (the means and instruments of production) which conditions the level of employment, production and consumption and, therefore, the level of the standard of living in successive periods which, in turn, constitutes the economy of progress in developed nations. On the other hand, the egalitarian policy is that of economic paralysis and antiprogress, that of the Third World countries.

The famous Austrian economist, Schumpeter, established the principles that "without change, that is, without technology, there are no profits, and without profits, there is no change, that is, progress." In Spanish socialism, of 19th century vintage, we have the paradox of wanting to achieve the results of a dynamic economy while applying static, paralyzing methods; therefore, our socialism acts against the attainment of the necessary profits.

Conditions and Limits of Reconversion

The basis of economic progress is to replace the work factor with the capital factor; in other words, it is the latter which makes it possible

to free excess labor and this, in turn, being transferred to other sectors, makes it possible to increase production and consumption and maintain a high level of employment. The limit of this process is the saving available within the country and obtained through foreign credits. Therefore, if the profits are reduced, the time comes when the formation of capital with its annual variations is negative, primary development is paralyzed and soon there is regression. As a result, the amount of saving derived from the two above-mentioned sources denotes the limits of reconversion.

However, in an economy of Marxist inspiration, such as that in Spain, the yield is immorality, sin, which is destined gradually to destroy and replace the private sector with the public sector; this comes about by asphyxiating the private sector and this, in turn, produces costs so high that they cannot be met by our industrialists who will continue to exist for only a temporary period.

Therefore, whatever the plan of reconversion and during that period, we should analyze the following points.

1. What, expressed in quantitative form, are the prospects of the markets with reference to demand, both domestic and foreign?
2. What will be the financial results for companies and financial institutions which grant credits, given the fiscal and wage policy now in effect?
3. In what period of time will reconversion be achieved and what will be the situation of Spanish industry compared with that of other countries; in this connection it will be necessary to establish which countries will be used for comparison and the obstacles encountered by those countries as quantitative limitations imposed, as well as the extent of reconversion established simultaneously in those countries.
4. What are the results with respect to the labor balance during each period, the costs of new work stations and the manner in which they will be financed? None of this has yet been achieved.

Uncontrolled Takeoff of Steel Industry

The manner in which reconversion was announced in the steel industry reminds us of the controlled takeoff in the construction sector; but in this case the takeoff is allegedly uncontrolled.

According to a news release dated 15 April 1983, the minister of industry asserted in Parliament before the relevant committee that "the quantity of steel produced should be 7 million tons per year, which is sufficient for our present consumption. We should never provide facilities whose capacity would exceed 7 million tons per year. Any increase beyond that figure will imply failure."

This attitude is genuinely misleading from an economic standpoint. According to official figures, steel production in Spain, as published in the Bank of Spain's Statistical Report (October 1983, page 114), was 12.5 million tons in 1980; 12.9 in 1981; 13.2 in 1982; and 13.1 in 1983, that is, almost double the figure given by the minister of industry; and, if we consider the increase in stock, export, import and apparent domestic consumption, even discounting all exports, 1 1/2 million tons would still be lacking for domestic consumption. Will anyone dare deny the similarity of this development with an uncontrolled takeoff? Thus, export to ECC countries is in a favorable position.

Reconversion and Reindustrialization

A very important and serious detail, in that it reveals insufficient knowledge of a basic problem having to do with industrial reconversion, was the statements made by the prime minister on 5 December 1983 on television in which he asserted that industrial reconversion and reindustrialization are different problems; in reality, we have here a single overall problem inasmuch as reconversion and reindustrialization are inseparable; if this were not so, the obvious increase in work stoppage would be dissimulated through early reitirement, substituting the unemployed with early retirees in the statistics; this procedure, although legally correct, would fool no one.

What happens is that in the present situation, if to the enormous expenditures of the public sector we add the many existing loopholes, those of reconversion and those of reindustrialization, it will be verified that it is impossible to keep pace with the present investment deficit, and we would see the failure of the entire socialist policy; here we must point out an obvious, essential difference between the government policy of Marxist inspiration and European social democracy, principally the German. At the end of World War II Germany was destroyed; its situation appeared untenable and bolshevism was thought to be inevitable. The Marshall Plan helped, but monetary reform and the social market economy were the deciding factors. The one who served as inspiration was Muller Armak and the men of action were Adenauer and Erhard. Planned economy was rejected, but state intervention was permitted and was carried out in satisfactory form and with adequate objectives. Economic determination is not permitted, that is, the Marxist trend, according to which capitalism inexorably produces a centralized state economy. Markets are not a product of capitalism but rather a permanent form of human behavior, a productive activity, not an immorality which must be annihilated, with business thus being rehabilitated; events have demonstrated the truth of this affirmation.

For that reason, beginning with Goderber's congress, German socialism was converted into a social democracy, and the word "nationalization" was crossed out of the party's official manual. The opposite occurred in Spain; the present prime minister asserted that Spanish socialism would not be converted into social democracy; here everything tends to be done on the basis of official undertakings inasmuch as it is all of Marxist inspiration with the entire economic policy being directed toward that end, although

within a certain time frame and without revolutionary violence; this is the basic explanation of what is happening; soft and moderate words on the one hand, but oriented toward the objectives mentioned. The situation of large companies and banks is worsening as a result of the measures which the government is taking with regard to those objectives, such as an increase in the money factor, an increase in the number of those who pay no interest at all, employment based on their assets and the raising of taxes to the point where the situation is no longer tenable with the result that they can no longer exist as private institutions. That is the true orientation of the present economic policy.

The Common Market and Reconversion

The lack of knowledge of the government, the Socialist Party and the opposition concerning the origin of the Common Market, its aims and objectives seems incredible. The Common Market emerged 25 years ago to replace the individual colonialism of the European nations which had experienced such bad results by acting individually inasmuch as this had led to two world wars through the joint colonialist activity of a group of nations. With regard to Spain, its objective has never been to organize a system of common development; rather, what it is seeking is an expansion of its export markets and, for this purpose, it has the maximum interest in dismantling our industry; this was accomplished by the national economic policy of Franco's Spain. This is what is concealed behind the words, "Europe," "democracy," etc.

During the recent visit of the German minister, Genscher, to Spain a few days before the Athens community summit, the minister promised to help Spain establish a date for its entrance into the EEC and said that he was not asking Spain to change anything; however, he was hoping that Spain would facilitate the German export of steel products to our country. His position is clear with regard to our industrial reconversion. It is possible that, despite the Athens summit, Spain will enter the Common Market; however, it is not definite and will occur only if it accepts colonialist servitude in the economic market and the political conditions imposed with regard to Gibraltar, reestablishing its prior situation which called for the free transit of personnel and goods, its indefinite postponement of the referendum on getting out of NATO and its entrance into the European monetary system to assure its colonialism. It is ingenuous to try to impose dates and conditions on Britain and France. Thus, the prime minister of the Spanish Government now knows the price which will have to be paid and the futility of wasting time with irrelevant declarations such as those made on Spanish television 5 December 1983. And if Spain succeeds in entering the Common Market under the conditions imposed upon it, we can already expect the reactions which will occur and the probable disappearance of the present system, for we must accept a very rapid breakdown in our customs control of its industrial exports, respect for French agrarian interests and a drastic reduction in fishing to promote its exports; and all of this is what they want to impose. And Spain will not be permitted to vary its exchange arrangements without EEC approval.

Contents of Decree of 4 December 1983

The above-mentioned decree law covers a standard law which will be implemented in the form of decrees for each reconverted sector after prior negotiation with company management and union organizations, and each plan will be submitted for state approval.

The three most important articles are 7, 9 and 11, for they cover qualitative variation in the state's participation. According to Article 7, for companies eligible for reinvestment it will be possible to establish "the obligation of forming part of a reconverted company" and "the state will be represented in all company organizations and any decision will have to have state agreement."

Article 9 reads: "To receive certain subsidies, not connected with the financing of new investments by companies in reconversion, the state may require prior cession to the company being reconverted or similar administration, for the duration of the reconversion process, voting rights in the same proportion as the proportion the subsidies have the the share capital figure."

Article 11 establishes "participative credits" through which public or private entities may grant loans of a participative nature in which, independent of the interest agreement, the creditor is granted participation in the net profit of the debtor.

In practice, any firm in reconversion, with official plans, is totally subject to the state for the duration of the reconversion process.

The difference from the previous situation is very great. It is no longer a question of credits and tax reductions received by companies faced with difficulties; rather, through the measures established by the above articles, companies in reconversion are in practice nationalized for the duration of the reconversion process.

To appreciate the consequences of this new law on the companies so constituted, the volume of credits and their distribution between the public and private sectors, we need only to point out that 900 billion [pesetas] has been advanced in this connection for interests, subsidies, etc.

In summary, the new law, of great bureaucratic complexity and in many points ambiguous, is following the policy of a socialism of Marxist inspiration and, therefore, of nationalization, and its effects will be negative in comparison with one which could have been adopted with a system of private enterprise.

8568

CSO: 3548/149

INVESTMENTS IN MARKET-POTENTIAL, FOREIGN CAPITAL FIELDS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] Despite increasing production costs, investments are continuing in fields that have market potential and the opportunity for cooperation with foreign capital. In addition, groups that have their own credit resources are continuing their investments in the field of industrial production.

A scarcity of resources and increases in the cost of investment constitute the most significant impediments to investment by companies. As increases in the cost of obtaining credit approach seventy to eighty percent, only those companies that have their own resources are able to undertake new investments in areas with market potential. Within the field of industrial production in particular, investment costs have increased by 60 percent from 5.9 million liras per worker in 1982 to the current figure of 9.5 million liras per worker. Despite such increases, companies that are able to obtain the backing of foreign capital are continuing with their investments.

Ercan Holding undertook two new investment projects in 1983. Its towtruck factory that is being built in Ankara represents an investment of 9.5 billion liras. Foreign capital represents 33.34 percent of this amount. Ercan Holding's other investment project was a factory for large diesel engines which was started in June 1982 and which began production in early 1983. The factory has an investment value of 10 billion liras and a foreign investment share of 34 percent of this amount. The Ercan Group is currently involved in investment efforts towards a plant that will allow it to become active in industries related to the automotive industry. An Ercan Holding official has indicated that market possibilities have directed their organization towards new investments and that the participation of foreign capital has played a significantly supportive role.

While no new investments were initiated by Koc Holding during

1983, certain investments undertaken in earlier years became operational during 1983. A trailer factory to be built in Adapazari in collaboration with foreign investment represents a new project for this group. It is expected that production at the 2 billion lira facility will begin in 20 months. The following is a list of companies and shares that will be represented within the new company:

<u>SHAREHOLDER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF HOLDINGS</u>
Koc Holding	12.5
Mengerler Holding	25.0
Otosan Group	25.0
Otoyol Group	35.0
Private Individuals	3.5

Alarko Holding has also seen the fruition of two of its investments during the course of this year. Alarko's Alpom pump factory was built with an investment of 450 million liras. The facility will also manufacture diving equipment not produced in Turkey until now. The Tekiz factory for architectural equipment and components is a 450 million lira joint venture between Alarko Holding and Koc Holding. Uzeyir Garih who is Chairman of the steering council of the Alarko Industrial and Commercial Corporation has indicated that very little credit was used to bring about these investments and that the company's own resources were used to a large extent.

The Toprak Holding paper towel factory which has been under construction for the past 3 years is scheduled to begin production in 1986. In addition to its investments in ceramics, plexiglass and paper, the group is preparing for an investment in the electronics industry within the Bozuyuk region. Ergun Korkut who is the General Director of the holding company has stated that the group is investing in fields where it perceives the existence of market opportunity.

The Cumra malt factory which will be owned by the Anadolu Industrial Holding Company is expected to begin production in 1984. The factory will produce most of the Efes Pilsen Group's long-term requirement for malt and is likely to export a significant portion of its production. The Polinas Plastic Industries and Commercial Corporation which is scheduled to produce polypropylene in 1985 is also owned by the Anadolu Industrial Holding Company. This group is also planning a joint automotive investment with the Japanese.

ECONOMY URGED BASED ON SOLID PLANNING, NOT EXPECTATIONS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] Business circles have been dominated by anticipation since 6 November 1983. In fact this anticipation began in the period preceding elections. As the administration of the country inevitably slowed down just prior to the elections, the business world entered a period of waiting during which it conducted an assessment of possible election results. After Ozal's election victory on 6 November 1983, those who were familiar with Ozal's earlier views and policies during previous administrations began to construct models based on certain assumptions while managing their affairs within a framework delineated by such models.

Ozal's actions while working for the State Planning Organization during the second half of the 1960's and while belonging to various governments between 1980 and 1982 are causing businessmen to espouse certain notions when coupled with the prime minister's pre-election statements. Although Ozal's party is a new party and the model that will be put together by the newly elected deputies remains unknown, Ozal's distinct personality is being viewed as the only determinant factor during the period of waiting.

While it has refrained from making any statements about Ozal's plans for the economy, since the elections the business world has given the impression that it precisely knows what Ozal is going to do. The model that has been speculatively put together without any input from Ozal has by now achieved such widespread acceptance that the format of our economy over the next five years is being presupposed before the formation of a government, the preparation of a governmental program or the presentation of any plans by Ozal. At this time, business circles are hoping that Ozal will begin the implementation of his program as soon as possible.

Business circles have developed a model prior to the development or announcement of any governmental policy on interest rates. According to the model, controls on interest rates will not be removed, but the rates will be increased. Business circles have begun the implementation of their own model without taking into consideration that no current information is available on how high interest rates can rise or on how production or sales should be organized vis-a-vis the new interest rates. It is also being expected that exports will be encouraged and that the determination of foreign currency exchange rates will be conducted on a more courageous basis. In view of these expectations, exports are being held back and all economic calculations are being based on the assumption that the dollar will rise to a point where it will be worth approximately 325 liras. It is expected that Ozal will follow a tight money policy. Anticipating that money will become scarce and expensive, business circles have undertaken new adjustments.

These developments have positive as well as negative sides. The appearance of strength that Ozal has obtained vis-a-vis business circles constitutes a positive aspect. As he begins work, Ozal is being perceived as a Prime Minister who is capable of implementing his policies and whose economic views are well known by business circles. On the other hand, the economic damage brought about by long term uncertainty and governmental vacuum constitutes a negative aspect. From the standpoints of stability and development, it is imperative that the economy be operated in accordance with well defined and finalized policies - not speculation. Businessmen who attempt to guess the future shape of the economy by assessing the personal opinions and actions of politicians in charge cannot orient themselves towards economically significant long term projects or make serious investments in connection with such projects.

9491
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NORDIC COUNTRIES HOPE FOR SOVIET ARCTIC DRILLING CONTRACTS

Stockholm 7 DAGAR in Swedish 9 Dec 83 p 25

[Article by Tom Vuori: "Struggle for Russian Oil"]

[Text] The Nordic countries are well positioned in the competition for selling technology to the oil drillings outside the Soviet Arctic coast.

The Soviet Arctic--with perhaps the world's largest potential of oil under the sea floor--could shortly become something of a Klondyke for Western technology and Western capital. The rush to Siberia has already quietly begun, and Finland, as well as Sweden, is in a favorable position in this race. For the Swedes the business deals with Moscow over the next 10 years could have a considerable impact both on foreign trade and on the oil supply.

Gotaverken and Kockums, among others, but also a number of smaller Swedish companies dealing with advanced technology, have already cast a glance eastward.

Geologists estimate that more than half of the world's untapped offshore oil reserves are located outside the Soviet Arctic coast. These oil reserves, mainly in the Barents, Petsora and Katara seas, could assure the supply of oil and gas in the future.

High costs and lack of knowhow have previously caused the Russians to keep the oil "in reserve" as long as the oil fields in the south produced what was needed for domestic consumption and in addition was sufficient for export.

But in Moscow it has now been decided that it is time to utilize the enormous Arctic oil potential. The Russians cannot cope with this alone. The extremely difficult conditions in combination with the lack of advanced technology forces them to turn to the West to get help in solving the practical problems, in exchange for oil.

In the West one is not at all disinterested in the possibilities at which the Russians are hinting.

Entire New Cities

Compared to the oil fields planned in Siberia, a mining combine such as Kostamus on the Finnish border (a building project which has employed thousands of Finns) or a port construction in Tallinn (for which Swedish and Finnish contractors are competing) seem like a simple finger exercise.

A single fully equipped oil rig for Arctic conditions costs in the neighborhood of 12-15 billion kronor. And many rigs are needed. Add to them roads, ports, ice breakers, oil and gas pipelines, entire new cities for the people who are to work with the oil.

Further, add to that a great demand for subcontractors for everything from elevators and cranes to electronics and computer systems.

"I would probably become somewhat frustrated if we did not have a whole series of contracts ready within 5 years," says Prof Pauli Jumppanen at the Finnish National Technical Institute. He leads a state commission in which representatives of several Finnish companies under consideration and representatives of the Ministry of Gas and Oil in Moscow are jointly to study the areas in which the Finns can assert themselves.

The commission was created at the initiative of Finnish business and industry, and among the members is Wartsila, which has long supplied icebreakers to the Soviet Union, and Rauma-Repola, which has built three drilling ships for the Barents Sea and which at the moment is busy with an order for two drilling platforms. Nokia and Stromberg are among the companies thought to have good prospects for exporting electronics.

The in many respects most interesting company is the state-owned oil company Neste, which for many years has conducted an active and extrovert policy and established itself in the search for oil in many other parts of the world. At Neste people have the ambition that they themselves want to produce the oil they refine (and export to Sweden, among other countries).

Touchy Russians

The company does not want to discuss publicly just how one envisions the involvement in the Soviet Union and on what scale one hopes to join in.

"The Russians are rather touchy on this level. They easily get the idea that you are anticipating events, and then they get offended and withdraw. We do not want to risk that," says one of the officials who is responsible for Neste's trade with the East.

Commissions similar to the Finno-Soviet one also exist in Sweden, Norway, the FRG and Holland.

Finland's trump card in the race is the system of bilateral trade with the Soviet Union, the confidence and the experience the Soviets have with Finnish

technology and the fact that trade between the countries is already lively and moves at a highly forced level for economic as well as political reasons.

Norway's best card is the country's own experience in offshore drilling. The Norwegians have also conducted intense research in the field with a view to their own future activity at more northerly latitudes. But the question is how interested Norway as an oil-producing country is in projects which can only result in and be paid for with oil. On the other hand, the oil can always be sold on the world market.

Sweden needs both oil and gas, and chances for the Swedes to get some pieces of the Siberian cake are judged excellent by Finnish experts.

Here in Helsinki there is respect for Swedish efforts in advanced technology on a small scale and Swedish research around offshore activity under difficult conditions.

Spoke in the Wheel

Professor Jumppanen specifically mentioned Swedish knowledge in the matter of underwater work.

Sweden should also be competitive as regards automation and instruments.

Moreover, the Swedish government will shortly submit a proposal for the ocean resources activity, according to the magazine DAGENS INDUSTRI. The proposal suggests among other things a new training center, where graduate engineers are to be trained as qualified divers, and in addition support for technical development in the offshore sector in Arctic waters and in underwater technology.

Countries which can also put a spoke in the wheel for Nordic technology are France and Canada. Beyond that, those who are dangerous are above all the Japanese, who in recent years have made advances in the field. The major U. S. consortiums, among others, have increasingly willingly accepted the favorable Japanese terms in offshore drilling outside North America and Canada.

"Ultimately, transports at sea are so cheap that distances do not matter very much," Professor Jumppanen says.

Who in the end will take off for the virgin Arctic Ocean expanses remains to be seen.

One knows--or on good grounds thinks that one knows--that this is where the big oil reserve is. But the problem is to find it.

Mid-1990's

At this moment the Russians, more or less on their own, are looking for it.

Finnish experts anticipate that actual production will get underway some time in the mid-1990's. Building an offshore oil field under Arctic conditions (such a field does not yet exist anywhere but is under construction in Canada) is expected to take between 6 and 8 years. Consequently, it is not difficult to calculate when the first oil finds suitable for exploitation have to be made, so that the boom for which Finland is hoping will get going in accordance with the timetable one has in mind.

Apparently no one doubts the fact that the oil is there--and that the findings depend on how efficiently one can, or wants to, explore.

11949

CSO: 3650/73

OIL AND GAS IMPORTS UP IN FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1983

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 17 Dec 83 p 33

[Text] Total gasoline and oil imports increased by 1.8 percent during the first ten months of the year. A total of 377,754.1 tons were imported compared to 370,754.4 tons during the same months last year. Increase in import value between the two years is 113 percent, or approximately 2,235.7 million kronur compared to 1,049.9 million kronur during the same months last year.

Import of crude oil increased by 6.3 percent during the ten month period and amounted to 111,642.5 tons this year as compared to 105,053.7 tons last year. Increase in value this year was 146 percent or 503.9 million kronur compared to 204.9 million kronur for the same period last year.

Heating oil import increased by one percent during the first ten months of the year with a total of 148,905.1 tons compared to 146,905.1 tons for the same period last year. Value increase between the years is approximately 114.2 percent or 934.6 million kronur compared to 436.4 million kronur for the same period last year.

Import of gasoline decreased by approximately 7.5 percent for the period, with 75,182.9 tons imported compared to 81,312.4 tons for the same period last year. Value increase between the years comes to approximately 78.9 percent or 507.7 million kronur compared to 283.8 million kronur for the same period last year.

Jet fuel import increased by 13.6 percent for the period, with a total of 41,689.7 tons imported compared to 36,708.9 tons for the same period last year. Value increase between years comes to about 135.3 percent or 284.5 million kronur compared to 120.9 million kronur for the same period last year.

Finally it is worth noting that import of conventional aircraft fuel decreased by about 23 percent during the first ten months of the year, with a total of 596.9 tons imported compared to 774.3 tons for the same period last year. Increase in value between the two years is approximately 30 percent or a little over 5 million kronur compared to a little over 3.85 million kronur for the same period last year.

9981

CSO: 3626/15

WIND ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF CATALONIAN ENERGY

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 15 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by J.S.]

[Text] In January anemometers will be installed everywhere in Catalonia. Wind energy will produce a savings of 593,000 tons of oil annually.

Catalonia can save 4.1 percent of the energy it will need by the year 2000 if it harnesses local wind energy. In order to measure the places where the wind blows hardest, anemometers will be installed everywhere in the territory around January.

Barcelona--Devices for measuring wind intensity (anemometers) will be placed at 83 points in Catalonia for 3 years. They will be used to draw the wind map and to know where aerogenerators of electricity may be installed. Catalonia's potential wind energy has already been quantified in an approximate way: Catalonia has between 600 and 1600 megawatts of installable power. An average of 2400 million watts per hour could be produced every year.

The wind measuring program has been led and directed by the Industry and Energy Council of the Generalitat. It will last for 3 years and 36 million pesetas will be invested in it. The purchase of the equipment for measuring and recording, with its stands, turrets and auxiliary elements will be the responsibility of the ENHER company, according to an agreement signed last month. Installation of the material at the 83 places will be awarded by public bidding. The department of the Generalitat will be responsible for gathering data and turning them into a map of wind intensities in long term averages.

Installation of the devices for gathering data on the wind that blows in Catalonia will begin next month. So far some soundings have been made based on the observatories that have anemometers and with a questionnaire that has been sent to all the Town Councils. This questionnaire has also been sent to half a thousand members of the Union of Peasants. Replies have been received by one third of those to whom it was sent, belonging to a little over half the municipalities in Catalonia.

One of the questions addressed to the Town Councils and peasants was how many wind-names they knew. Since only half the municipalities has sent in the reply, the authors of the questionnaire have deduced that if all of them had done so, there would be 415 names.

With the same extrapolation, approximately equivalent to multiplying by two, it has been established that there should be 1,292 very windy places in the whole territory of Catalonia. The number of weathervanes indicating wind direction must be 2,870; plus 147 anemometers that measure wind direction. There are also 771 windmills for pumping water and 186 for producing electricity.

The provisional data have been published in a booklet of the department of industry and energy. It is the summary of a more extensive work composed of eight documents. It bears the title of "Preliminary and Definitive Studies of the Equipment Needed for Making the Wind Map of Catalonia" and is the work of Josep Puig and Conrad Messeguer.

The purpose of publishing the summary is to contribute to a better knowledge of the wind potential of Catalonia and to encourage citizens to use the wind as an energy source.

It also says that by the year 2000, Catalonia will be able to save 4.1 percent of its projected energy demand if aerogenerators of electricity are set up in the most appropriate places. Outside energy dependence could be reduced to about 2400 GWh, equivalent to the energy produced by 593,000 tons of oil.

Installation of these windmill generators of electricity would require an initial investment of 68,590 pesetas.

12448

CSO: 3548/151

ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION UP, CALL FOR CONSERVATION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Dec 83 p 3

[Text] It has been announced that our production of electrical power has increased by 5 percent in comparison to last year and that this increase is in conformity with targeted increases in the production of electrical energy.

In a statement to a reporter from the Turkish News Agency, Kamil Toktas who is the Director General of the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise indicated that production fell below earlier expectations and that this was brought about by inadequate seasonal rainfall. He said: "We were able to attain 91 percent of our production goal. Had we had the rainfall that we were anticipating, the production of electricity through hydroelectric means would not have suffered and we would have achieved 97 percent of our production goal."

Adding that increases in the production of our electricity should not be solely dependent upon rainfall, Toktas said: "To some extent, the production of electricity is contingent upon rainfall. Nevertheless, well structured and adequate means of financing that can be translated into investments in the field of electricity production should be provided in response to increasing power requirements and the production of electricity through electromechanical means should be encouraged. If this is not provided, we will not have sufficient electricity."

Toktas noted that obtaining a supply of electricity comparable to the supplies of modern nations (a high quality uninterrupted supply with ample reserves) would require an average yearly investment of 900 billion liras. Toktas stated that while the government was attempting to increase production to the extent possible in view of its limited resources, shortages of electricity still existed in energy intensive sectors of industrial production. Toktas attributed these shortages to the fact that energy consumption within these sectors increased at a faster

rate than increases in the levels of energy production. In a subsequent portion of his statement, Toktas stressed the need for widespread acceptance of energy conservation among consumers and asked every producer in the industrial sector to lower consumption as much as possible without reducing production. Toktas also alluded to the matter of bringing electrical power to rural areas and stated that the target of bringing electricity to 2000 more villages had been achieved. He indicated that this brought to 24,000 the total number of villages with electrical power.

9491

CS0:3554/93

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE BACKS DEMAND FOR NEW SEA LIMIT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Dec 83 p 48

[Text] In a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee last Monday the foreign minister submitted a final report made by a U.S. ocean floor specialist. The report supports Iceland's claim to the Reykjanes ridge and extensive areas off the ridge's slopes. This specialist was also engaged by Iceland during the Jan Mayen case where his input was of incalculable worth, according to an interview with Eyjolfur Konrad Jonsson by MORGUNBLADID's reporter yesterday.

Eyjolfur Jonsson identified the specialist as Dr Talwani, ex-chairman of the Geological Institute of Columbia University in New York. His report was submitted confidentially. Eyjolfur Jonsson stated that in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday morning a decision had been made for representatives of the political parties in the Althing to devise a way for all the parliamentary parties to unite before the Christmas recess in preparing for negotiations with England, Ireland and Denmark representing the Faroes. These negotiations are expected to take place within the next few weeks and--according to Eyjolfur Jonsson--will be organized along the same lines as the earlier Jan Mayen negotiations.

Asked about the report, he replied that it was confidential; however, he said it was no secret that it was very supportive of Iceland's point of view as aired for the past four years by statements by the Althing, etc. The U.S. specialist considers it Iceland's right to claim the Reykjanes ridge besides extensive areas off the ridge's slopes and rights to the Rockall plateau; however, he approves of Iceland's policy for the past four years to seek cooperation with other nations laying claims to the area. In conclusion Eyjolfur Jonsson emphasized the area's importance to us, both for its biological and chemical yields.

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson stated that as of last night preliminary negotiations with England and Ireland were expected to commence in late January, but he was unwilling to elaborate on the contents of the report.

9981

CSO: 3626/15

GOVERNMENT PROMISES STORTING COMPREHENSIVE SVALBARD REPORT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Government will Present a Svalbard Report"]

[Text] The Storting will in the course of the current session have the opportunity to debate the situation concerning Svalbard and Norwegian activities in the archipelago comprehensively. Justice Minister Mona Rokke stated in the Storting yesterday that the government most likely will present a report to the Storting on Svalbard.

The Justice minister gave this information yesterday when the Storting debated and adopted the Svalbard budget for next year. The Svalbard budget itself amounts to 63.6 million kroner, but in addition 202.6 million kroner is distributed among various ministries for other activities in the archipelago. Over three fourths of the latter amount is found in the budget of the industry ministry. Jakob Aano, chairman of the Storting foreign affairs committee, and former premier Odvar Nordli both welcomed the opportunity for a comprehensive debate on Svalbard. Nordli said that in both absolute and relative terms Norwegian research efforts in Svalbard are in decline, though general interest in research in the Svalbard area is increasing. Guttorm Hansen (Labor), spokesman for Svalbard matters in the Storting, stressed that Norway's exercise of sovereignty over Svalbard is closely connected to the Norwegian level of activity. "This is something neither the Storting nor the government can overlook," said Hansen.

Two twin-engine helicopters from A/S Lufttransport [Air Transport, Inc] will now be stationed in Svalbard, considerably increasing the Governor's air service.

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